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Taking Systemic Risk Seriously in Financial Regulation
M. Todd Henderson & James C. Spindler*
Bank regulation failed in the run up to the financial crisis o f2008, as it has numerous 
times in the course o f U.S. history. This is despite the existence o f traditional pruden­
tial regulation, such as capital adequacy mandates, reserve requirements, and bank 
examination, as well as more common legal remedies, such as tort and contract 
litigation. Unsurprisingly, in the wake o f these failures, many reforms have been 
proposed, and some adopted, to try to reduce bank risk taking. These reforms include 
limiting bank size, requiring bank managers to be paid differently, restricting invest­
ment in high-risk financial products, and, o f course, tightening up existing prudential 
regulation.
In this Article, we first categorize these proposals into traditional categories o f 
regulation—ex ante and ex post forms—and point out the weaknesses o f each. Ex 
post regulation— generally, liability after the fact for harm caused—fails almost by 
construction: given externalities o f systemic risk and leverage, judgment-proofness 
is virtually guaranteed and is uninsurable. Ex ante regulation— which comprises the 
bulk o f current prudential relation— is, as a starting point, inefficient because it fails 
to take into account both private information and subsequent public information. 
More vexingly, ex ante regulation encourages worse behavior: size limits and 
transactions taxes encourage higher-octane bets, and asset restrictions lead to the 
recreation o f the same risk profiles in less efficient ways.
We then describe an intermediate form, what we call the “regulatory veto, ” which 
allows regulators to intervene to reduce bank risk taking after banks have started 
their activities, but before the losses have occurred. We show how the regulatory 
veto is, potentially, an elegant solution to the information problem presented by ex 
ante regulation and the judgment-proofness problem o f ex post regulation o f bank 
activities. However, the regulatory veto is subject to a structural flaw: banks get to 
move first in a form o f the ultimatum game and choose supra-optimal levels o f bank 
activities, which are not quite bad enough to cause regulators to shut them down. To 
mitigate this flaw, we propose reforms to enhance regulators’ ability to credibly 
commit and to reduce banks ’ ability to game the system.
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Introduction
Modern American bank regulation is an array o f devices designed to limit risk at 
individual banks and in the banking system as a whole. Allowing banks to take 
deposits and other short-term liabilities in order to invest in loans and other long­
term financial assets creates wealth, but private wealth-generating activities may not 
be socially valuable if  the costs they externalize onto others exceed the benefits. 
Banking regulation, therefore, attempts to attain the socially optimal level o f  banking 
activity by limiting the activity o f banks.1 Departures from the optimum hurt society: 
too little lending lowers bank profits and reduces the economy’s access to credit, 
while too much lending and investment creates excessive risks that will largely, in 
the event o f catastrophic failure, be borne by someone else.
The regulatory tool kit o f bank regulation is diverse and includes both what we 
term ex ante and ex post forms o f  regulation. Consider first ex ante bank regulation 
(often referred to as “prudential” bank regulation).2 Entry into the banking business 
is regulated by state and federal agencies. The kinds o f activities banks can engage 
in— the “business o f banking” and activities “necessary” to this business— are lim­
ited.3 “Safety and soundness” rules4 limit the types and sizes o f loans, restrict lending 
and other dealings to and with bank executives, mandate amounts o f cash that must 
be held in reserve,5 and prescribe limits on the amount o f leverage that banks may
1. For welfarists, this is the purpose of regulation of any activity. As discussed below, 
the case for active and aggressive regulation is stronger in the banking context than in other 
areas. While it might make sense to let our regulation of most consumer goods be handled 
through voluntary market transactions and an ex post remedy for fraud or other harm, this 
approach is unlikely to work for banking.
2. See About the OCC, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, https://www 
.occ.treas.gov/about/what-we-do/mission/index-about.html |https://perma.cc/SGE2-H77X].
3. E.g., The National Bank Act, 12 U.S.C. § 24(7) (2012).
4. See, e.g., Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, 
Bank Supervision Process: Comptroller’s Handbook (2007) (describing the seven 
categories of safety and soundness regulation).
5. Various state and federal regulators, such as the Department of Treasury or the Office 
of the Comptroller of the Currency, prescribe reserve requirements—cash on hand banks must
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take.6 Disclosure obligations under Basel Pillar 3 mandate disclosure to enable “m ar­
ket discipline” o f  banks.7 Federal deposit insurance mandates that banks pay prem i­
ums to  insure demand deposits against deficiencies.8 Finally, various governm ent 
agencies have broad statutory power to seek injunctive relief and dam ages in the 
event o f  losses caused by banking.9 So far, banking regulation looks a lot like other 
areas o f  regulation, albeit far stricter and more com prehensive.
Ex post m easures generally involve mopping up after the dam age has been done. 
Jilted creditors and counterparties may pursue their rem edies in court, as may the 
governm ent, particularly in the case o f  a federal payout. Banks that fail are forced 
into receivership, their assets unwound, and creditors paid o ff to the extent possib le.10 
Finally, bank personnel who have com m itted w rongdoing may be sued or 
prosecuted.
In addition, there is a rather unique banking regulatory institution that spans ex 
post and ex ante measures. Specialized regulators, known as “exam iners,” are as­
signed to individual banks." Exam iners have an additional, and unusual, mandate:
maintain to repay depositors and creditors. For example, the Federal Reserve Board’s 
Regulation D prescribes reserve requirements beyond those required by law. Reserve Require­
ments, FederalReserve.gov, http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/reservereq.htm 
[https://perma.ee/4JJ8-XTK6] (last updated Oct. 27, 2016). For example, the Gam-St. 
Germain Act exempts the first $2 million from reserve obligations, and the first $25 million 
above this is subject to a relatively low (i.e. 3 percent) reserve requirement by the Monetary 
Control Act of 1980. Id. Regulation D sets the reserve requirement above $115.1 million at 10 
percent. Id.
6. Specifically, capital adequacy requirements, primarily under the Basel Accords, limit 
the bank’s ability to engage in risky activities that generate obligations the bank may be unable 
to repay. For a discussion of the Federal Reserve’s implementation of the Basel Accords, see 
generally Risk-based Capital Guidelines, 73 Fed. Reg. 43,982 (June 26, 2008), (to be codified 
at 12 C.F.R. pts. 208, 225).
7. See Basel Comm. On Banking Supervision, Bank for Int’l Settlements, 
Revised Pillar 3 Disclosure Requirements (2015), http://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d309.pdf 
|https://perma.cc/H4GW-F4EK], For an example o f Pillar 3 disclosure, see, e.g., Bank of Am., 
Pillar 3 Disclosures, Investor Relations, http://investor.bankofamerica.com/phoenix.zhtml 
?c=71595&p=iro!-bascl#fbid=5xLoxBRdnYn [https://perma.ee/F5VH-LQWN].
8. See 12 U.S.C. tj 1811 (2012) (including regulations promulgated thereunder); 
Understanding Deposit Insurance, FDIC, http://www.fdic.gov/deposit/deposits/ 
[https://perma.ee/P6S5-FBUN] (last updated Jan. 5, 2017).
9. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 198 (2012) (giving receivers appointed by the Comptroller of 
the Currency powers to buy bank assets).
10. See, e.g., Receivership Management Program, FDIC (May 19, 2015), https://www 
.fdic.gov/about/strategic/strategic/receivership.html [https://perma.ee/FU4T-6C2H],
11. According to the Washington Mutual (WaMu) failure report, “FDIC assigns a dedi­
cated examiner to the largest insured financial institutions. The dedicated examiner serves as 
the case manager for these institutions and works in cooperation with primary supervisors and 
bank personnel to obtain real-time access to information about an institution’s risk and trends.” 
Dep’t. of Treasury, Offices of Inspector Gen., Evaluation of Federal Regulatory 
Oversight of Washington Mutual Bank 69 (2010) [hereinafter WaMu Report], To as­
sess risk at a broader level, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) conducts a wide 
range of activities to monitor and assess risk from a regional and national perspective. At the 
institutional level, FDIC monitors large non-FDIC supervised institutions primarily through
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to assess the riskiness o f  a bank’s entire bank portfolio o f  activities and to shut down 
the whole bank or specific bank activities if  the expected costs and harms o f  the 
activities are excessive.12 In theory, bank exam iners ought to be able to zero in on the 
activity sweet spot at which social welfare is maximized. W hile the nature and scope 
o f  exam inations differ, for large, com plex banks, the examination team is a constant 
regulatory presence.1' Regulators have vast powers to curtail bank activities, to re­
quire increased m onitoring o f  activities, to require the bank to raise more capital, to 
impose new operating procedures, to replace m anagem ent, and even to shut down 
specific activities or the entire bank .14
N otwithstanding the panoply o f  regulatory measures available, this regulatory 
system utterly failed in the run up to the financial crisis o f  2008, as many banks and 
financial firms collapsed or had to be bailed out as the result o f  too much exposure 
to residential real estate, especially derivative instruments linked to subprime loans.15 
This was not the first tim e the system failed to keep bank activities in check. During 
the Savings and Loan (S&L) Crisis o f  the late 1980s, certain types o f  banks, known 
as thrifts, engaged in far too much lending to particular borrowers, resulting in w ide­
spread bank failures.16 In just the two most recent crises, the estim ated direct losses 
in the trillions o f  do llars.17 The indirect costs and broader social costs are probably
its Dedicated Examiner and Case Manager programs. FDIC relies on the Primary Federal 
Regulator’s (PFR) examinations to determine a bank's overall condition and the risks posed 
to the Deposit Insurance Fund. Additionally, FDIC, by statute, has special examination author­
ity and certain enforcement authority for all insured depository institutions for which it is not 
the PFR. Id. at 67.
12. The “safety and soundness” rules, see supra note 4 and accompanying text, require 
evaluation of attributes such as asset quality, risk governance, liquidity, and earnings.
13. For a detailed discussion o f the supervision process, see generally M. Todd Henderson 
& Frederick Tung, Pay for Regulator Performance, 85 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1003 (2012); 1 Fed. 
Deposit Ins. Corp., An Examination of the Banking Crises of the 1980s and Early 
1990s 421 (1997) |hereinafter FDIC Report], https://www.fdic.gov/bankyhistorical/history 
/voll.html |htlps://perma.cc/F8ZS-2Z4W|. For instance, during the period leading up to 
WaMu’s failure, federal bank examiners spent over 160,000 hours (about 27,000 per year on 
average) working exclusively on supervision of WaMu. WaMu Report, supra note 11, at 17, 
Table 5. Examinations averaged about 150 days in length and were conducted by the 
equivalent of twenty full-time employees. Id. at 16-17, Tables 5, 6.
14. See Henderson & Tung, supra note 13, at 1019-21.
15. See Steve Denning, Big Banks and Derivatives: Why Another Financial Crisis Is
Inevitable, Forbes (Jan. 8, 2013, 6:26 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/
stevedenning/2013/01/08/five-years-afier-the-financial-meltdown-the-water-is-still-full-of-big 
-sharks/ [https://perma.cc/7SQH-UZYY].
16. For an account of the S&L Crisis, see generally James R. Barth, The Great Savings 
and Loan Debacle (1991).
17. For an estimate of the costs of the S&L Crisis, see generally Timothy Curry & Lynn 
Shibut, The Cost o f  the Savings and Loan Crisis: Truth and Consequences, 13 FDIC BANKING 
Rev., no. 2, 2000, at 26, 33. For an estimate of the direct fiscal costs of the current financial 
crisis, see generally David Luttrell, Tyler Atkinson & Harvey Rosenblum, Fed. Reserve Bank 
of Dali., Assessing the Costs and Consequences o f  the 2007-09 Financial Crisis and Its 
Aftermath, 8 Econ. Letter, no. 7, 2013, http://www.dallasfed.org/research/cclett/2013 
/el 1307.cfm | https://perma.cc/EL3L-DVU4].
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many times this amount.18 Banking crises appear to be a recurring phenomenon; 
historically, the United States has experienced one about every twenty or thirty
19years.
In response to the most recent bank failures, new systems of bank regulation have 
been proposed and, to some extent, implemented. New rules require banks to claw 
back from executives erroneously earned pay, based on a negligence standard.20 Fed­
eral Reserve guidance effectively mandates restricted periods for performance-based 
compensation.21 The so-called Volcker Rule, as currently proposed, would restrict 
the ability o f banks to engage in proprietary trading deemed too risky.22 Several 
prominent academic commentators propose mandating inside debt compensation for 
managers.2 ’ Others propose regulators be empowered with the authority to prescreen 
bank activities to see whether they will improve social welfare.24 While apparently 
now discarded, there was a serious push for a tax on financial transactions25 and a
18. Luttrcll et al., supra note 17, at 2.
19. There were large banking crises in (at least) 1819, 1837, 1857, 1873, 1884, 1890,
1893, 1907, 1933, the late 1980s, and the late 2000s. For a more general treatment of banking 
crises, see generally Carmen M. Reinhart & Kenneth Rogoff, This Time Is Different: 
Eight Centuries of Financial Folly (2009).
20. See 12 C.F.R. § 380.7 (2016).
21. Guidance on Sound Incentive Compensation Policies, 74 Fed. Reg. 55,227 (proposed 
Oct. 27, 2009) (specifically stating the Federal Reserve’s “expectation” that banks will utilize 
long-term compensation methods, including deferral); see also Dodd-Frank Wall Street Re­
form and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 956, 124 Stat. 1376, 1905 (2010) 
(codified at I2U.S.C. §5641 (2012)). Congress requires that the appropriate federal regulators 
shall jointly prescribe regulations or guidelines that prohibit any type of incentive-based pay­
ment arrangement, or any feature of any such arrangement, that the regulators determine 
encourages inappropriate risks by covered financial institutions: (1) by providing an executive 
officer, employee, director, or principal shareholder of the covered financial institution with 
excessive compensation, fees, or benefits; or (2) that could lead to material financial loss to 
the covered financial institution).
22. § 619, 124 Stat. at 1620 (codified al 12 U.S.C. § 1851). The Act defines “proprietary 
trading” as “engaging as a principal for the trading account of the banking entity or nonbank 
financial company supervised by the Board in any transaction to purchase” or sale of securities 
or commodities. § 619, 124 Stat. at 1630.
23. See, e.g., Frederick l ung, Pay for Ranker Performance: Structuring Executive 
Compensation for Risk Regulation, 105 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1205, 1226-27(2011) (proposing bank 
executive compensation contracts include securities tied to a bank’s subordinated debt securi­
ties, since the price of these securities is tied to the downside risk of the bank and therefore 
will give bank executives incentives to reduce risk taking to socially optimal levels).
24. See, e.g, Eric A. Posner & E. Glen Wey I, An FDA for Financial Innovation: Applying 
the Insurable Interest Doctrine to Twenty-First-Century Financial Markets, 107 Nw. U. L. 
Rf.v. 1307 (2013) (arguing for an FDA-like administrative agency to preapprove new financial 
instruments before they are offered to the public or used by banks or other nonbank financial 
institutions).
25. In 2009, various proposals were introduced in the House to tax securities transactions. 
For instance. Rep. Peter DeFazio (D-OR) and Sen. Tom Flarkin (D-lowa) proposed a tax of 
twenty-five basis points on securities transactions. David Rogers, Pelosi Pushes Global Finan­
cial Fee, Politico, (Dec. 3, 2009, 9:51 PM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/1209 
/30200.html [https://perma.cc/U5Xl 1-N47L].
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lim itation on the size o f  banks.26
We are not optim istic that any o f  this regulation will prevent another banking 
crisis and believe some o f  these reform s may actually increase risk in the banking 
sector. We make our argum ent as follows. First, we describe how current and pro­
posed banking rules fit into fam iliar categories o f  regulation in other areas— that is, 
ex ante and ex post regulation— and consider the general costs and benefits o f  these 
approaches. We also identify a third type o f  regulation, the exam iner’s on-site 
evaluation o f  bank risk, which we call the “regulatory veto.” W hile in other areas o f  
econom ic activity we generally rely either on ex ante regulatory approval (e.g., drugs 
approved by the FDA or rules prescribed by the EPA) or ex post litigation (e.g., 
products liability law), in banking there is significant regulatory pow er that lies be­
tween these two poles. This is an underappreciated, but core, function o f  banking 
regulation.
Second, we consider ex ante and ex post regulation in banking, and find that they 
are either incapable o f  containing system ic risk and preventing future financial crises 
or unlikely to strike the optimal balance between regulation and wealth creation. The 
failure to contain risk arises from the “gam eability” o f  ex ante regulation, as banks 
and bank shareholders can often assem ble the same overall risk/reward profiles via 
alternative means. The rapid pace o f  financial innovation and the inability o f  regula­
tors to anticipate ahead o f  tim e all undesirable activities and activity levels means 
that lawm akers are often plugging one o f  many holes in the dyke, to little positive 
effect.27
To the extent that ex ante regulation does constrain behavior, we argue that it is 
unlikely to  be particularly helpful. The reason is that regulatory prescreening fails to 
capture information about the social value and cost o f  bank activities. Ex ante regula­
tions, i f  they work, do not allow parties to act fully upon their private information. 
For instance, a one-size-fits-all approach to bank size will necessarily be over- 
inclusive (lim iting good banks from socially beneficial activities above the portfolio 
limits) and underinclusive (allowing bad banks to engage in socially undesirable 
activities up to the portfolio limits). This lack o f  inform ation (about both costs and 
benefits) plagues existing proposals to regulate bank activities directly, such as pro­
posals for sm aller banks, lim its on am ounts and types o f  executive com pensation, 
and insurance requirem ents, in the form o f capital cushions. Further, the regulator’s 
inform ation may improve over tim e, a  benefit which is lost when both banks and the 
regulator are constrained by ex ante edicts.
Finally, ex ante regulation is plagued by public choice problem s. The dynam ics 
o f  congressional lobbying and the regulatory agency revolving door likely favor 
established institutions and tend to retard both new entry and econom ic growth.
26. E.g., Jonathan R. Macey & James P. Holdcroft, Jr., Failure Is an Option: An Ersatz- 
Antitrust Approach to Financial Regulation, 120 Yale L.J. 1368, 1371 (2011) (proposing to 
limit any financial institution from amassing “liabilities in an amount greater than 5%” than 
the FDIC insurance fund for deposits).
27. See, e.g., Ben S. Bemanke, Chairman, Fed. Reserve, Speech to the Federal Reserve 
Bank of Atlanta’s 2007 Financial Markets Conference (May 15, 2007) (stating that “regulators 
should resist the temptation to devise ad hoc rules for each new type of financial instrument 
or institution,” and that “[d]evising an appropriate regulatory response to financial innovation 
is challenging”).
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Politically powerful banks, rather than com petent ones, may be able to win conces­
sions from regulators. O ther industries, such as securities underwriting and 
com m odities trading, may seek to limit com petition by prohibiting bank entry into 
those areas.28
Ex post regulation is no panacea either. W hile legal action is available to both 
private parties and the governm ent to seek com pensation for losses caused by harm ­
ful banking practices, these suits are unlikely to be effective deterrents. As a practical 
matter, such suits are extrem ely rare. In term s o f  governm ent suits, this could be 
because o f  the political influence large banks have always had since the governm ent 
relies on them to create w ealth.2'* In term s o f  private suits, this may have to do with 
the com plexity o f  the cases, the expected litigation costs o f  m aking a suit, and the 
difficulty o f  proving a breach o f  a duty in this setting.30 But the larger failing o f  ex 
post regulation is judgm ent proofness. Where potential losses are very large, as they 
are for a banking crisis, most defendants are likely to be bankrupt and unable to pay 
any liability assessed. M andatory insurance, often used in other industries, is a ty p i­
cal way to m itigate the judgm ent-proofness problem , but this may be ineffective in 
the case o f  bank failures because o f  the system ic nature o f  the financial system: the 
entire industry may fail together— swam ping the resources o f  any mandatory insur­
ance system.
In any event, so long as banks face expected losses from wrongful activities that 
are lower than the externalized costs, banks will engage in too much banking activity 
and take on too much risk. In short, there is som e value to regulatory delay because 
the quantity and quality o f  information held by regulators, and thus the quality o f 
regulatory decisions, is increasing in time, but waiting too long is dangerous because 
the risk o f  judgm ent proofness is also increasing in time.
Third, we point out an unusual feature o f  banking regulation, which we believe is 
designed to am eliorate the problem s caused o f  both ex ante and ex post regulation 
by taking an interm ediate position. This is the institution o f  the bank examiner, who 
is authorized to veto or shut down a bank’s operations based on an assessm ent o f  the
28. By way of example in the realm of financial regulation, it has been argued that the 
Securities Act of 1933 served to “reduce competition among investment banks.” Paul 
Mahoney, The Political Economy o f  the Securities Act o f  1933. 30 J. Legal Stud. 1, 1 (2001).
29. The decision to not prosecute Goldman Sachs for its role in the financial crisis was 
decried by some commentators as an example of cronyism between large Wall Street financial 
institutions and regulators, occasioned by the revolving door between regulated firms and 
government. E.g., Peter Schweizer, Why Goldman Sachs, Other Wall Street Titans Are Not 
Being Prosecuted, The Daily Beast (Aug. 14, 2012, 04:45 AM), http://www.thedailybeasLcom 
/artieles/2012/08/l4/why-goldman-sachs-other-wall-street-tilans-are-not-being-proseculed.html 
[https://perma.cc/GW9H-ZHC8l.
30. The barriers for civil suits by government and private parties are substantial. Banks 
may not owe a fiduciary duty to their clients, and contracts between the bank and its customers 
are filled with disclaimers that limit the bank's liability. E.g.. Peter .1. Henning, Is That It for  
Financial Crisis Cases?, N.Y. Times: Deai.Book (Aug. 13, 2012, 11:22 AM), http://dealbook 
.nytimes.com/2012/08/l3/is-that-il-for-financial-crisis-cases/?_php=truc& lype=blogs&_r=0 
[https://perma.ee/C6L6-MP79], Plaintiffs also have to show scienter, which can be extremely 
difficult in these cases. See id.; Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfclder, 425 U.S. 185, 185 (1976). This 
is especially the case when both parties are sophisticated entities, as was the case in most of 
the allegedly fraudulent transactions leading up to the financial crisis. See Henning, supra.
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bank’s type and amount of activities on an ongoing basis.11 We call this feature a 
regulatory veto since it is a determination about whether existing activities should 
and can continue, made after they have commenced but before they have completed. 
The regulatory veto is intended to strike a balance between ex ante and ex post 
regulation, trying to avoid the informational problems o f the former and the it’s-too- 
late problem of the latter.12 For instance, it appears that examiners at Washington 
Mutual (WaMu) successfully identified excessive risk concentrations in some asset 
classes.”  Forcing an unwinding o f some o f these positions could, in theory, have at 
least limited the magnitude o f WaMu’s failure and its effect on the wider banking 
system.
Finally, despite the advantages of this intermediate approach, we describe a 
fundamental flaw o f the regulatory veto and point to this as a major source of the 
inefficient regulation of banks. While existing regulatory reforms focus on bad deci­
sions or incentives o f bankers, we argue that it is actually a game-theoretic problem 
that keeps the regulatory veto from functioning correctly: the veto game between the 
bank and the regulator is an ultimatum game in which the bank moves first. As we 
show below, since the bank gets to decide the activity before the examiner can veto 
it, the bank effectively presents the regulator with a take-it-or-leave-it offer. So long 
as overall social welfare is not sufficiently negative, the regulator will weakly prefer 
not to shut down an overly risky activity, since firm production yields a net societal 
benefit o f zero and the costs o f shutdown are positive and significant. The result is 
socially inefficient and excessive amounts o f  bank activity— not as high as without 
the regulatory veto, but still potentially far above the social optimum.
Thus, the regulatory veto model is a vital yet flawed component o f banking 
regulation. Therefore, our prescription for bank regulation reform is to try to improve 
the dynamics o f the bank-regulator game, so that making take-it-or-leave-it offers 
will be more costly for banks. Social welfare outcomes (though not firm profits) 
could be improved by giving the regulator an arsenal o f credible threats to veto bank 
activity; threats may be made credible by altering regulator incentives14 or enlarging 
the regulator’s permissible action set. Ex ante regulations that limit the costs of bank 
shutdown (such as so-called living wills) make the regulatory veto more efficient. 
We outline those areas we think most ripe for improvement.
31. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 1818(2012).
32. For instance, if a bank decides to engage in lending concentrated in a particular indus­
try or geography, the regulator could decide that the social risks arc too high and therefore 
demand the bank shut down the particular lending or the entire bank. The veto is exercised 
after a decision about whether to engage in the activity has been made by bankers and after 
regulators can observe the social cost of those activities. A more efficient allocation of re­
sources is possible because shareholders can act on their signal of prospective firm value, and 
because regulators can act based on an ex post signal of firm value and riskiness.
33. WaMu Report, supra note 11, at 15.
34. Henderson & l ung, supra note 13, at 1008-09 (proposing to compensate bank regula­
tors with securities mimicking the stock price and debt price of the banks they supervise in 
order to give the regulators upside and downside incentives from bank performance).
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I. T he Banking  Sy stem : A Primer
This section lays the groundwork for the normative analysis in Part III. We first 
discuss the generally accepted economic model of bank wealth creation, in which 
banks turn short-term liabilities (such as bank deposits) into long-term assets (such 
as mortgage loans). The mismatch between the maturities of liabilities and assets 
carries with it particular vulnerabilities that, given the importance of banking to the 
economy, may make some regulation desirable. We also describe how this model 
and the rationale for regulation extends to nonbank financial institutions that perform 
some traditional banking functions.
Next, we describe the current system of banking regulation. In our taxonomy, 
banking regulation is divisible into ex post and ex ante measures. Ex ante measures 
are those in which regulators require or prohibit certain bank activities (or levels of 
activity) before banks have undertaken any activity. Ex post describes the case where 
the regulator or legal system waits until after the banking activity has occurred and 
any harm has been realized before seeking remedies (or imposing punishments) 
against the bank and its managers. One form of bank regulation, that of the bank 
examiner and the regulatory veto, finds a middle ground between ex ante and ex post 
regulation.
Finally, we describe banking reform proposals that have surfaced in recent years. 
These proposals include bank size limits, a financial transactions tax, a financial 
FDA, and greater penalties on bank managers. We classify these reforms into our ex 
ante/ex post taxonomy. The ex ante/ex post classification aids our economic analysis 
of banking regulation, which we undertake in Part II.
A. Banking Basics—Long-short Mismatch, Runs, and Maintaining Confidence
The effective and efficient regulation of banks is crucial to a well-functioning 
economy. Banks perform the crucial role of intermediating short- and long-term 
financial investments— in effect creating the credit necessary for both businesses and 
households to function. This role, in addition to other ancillary functions of banks 
(such as operating payment systems and trading in securities), makes banks systemi- 
cally important in that the failure of many (or even one very large) banks is generally 
thought to have significant economic consequences beyond just the bank’s security 
holders and counterparties.
A problem with banks, though, is that the very feature that allows them to create 
value also makes them vulnerable to insolvency due to a decrease in asset values— or 
even for no reason at all. Following the famous Diamond & Dybvig model of bank­
ing, the central business model of banks (and so-called shadow banks, which are 
financial firms that undertake the same sort of strategy) is that banks borrow on short­
term maturities at a low interest rate, lend at long-term maturities at a high interest 
rate, and pocket the difference in interest rates on the two. ’3 Figure 1, below, depicts
35. See Douglas W. Diamond & Philip H. Dybvig, Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and 
Liquidity, 9 1 .1. Pol. Econ. 401 (1983) (providing a model o f banking stability given asset and 
liability mismateh and of bank runs and financial crisis in which even solvent banks are fragile 
under the stability model); see also Frederic S. Mishkin & Stanley G. Eakins, Financial 
Markets and Institutions 403 (7th ed. 2012).
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a bank that takes various forms of primarily short-term liabilities (such as deposits 
and repurchase agreements) and converts them primarily into long-term assets (such 
as mortgages and term loans to businesses); revenues from the assets are used to pay 
interest and principal on the short-term liabilities.
Short-term
lending
Mortgages
Short-term 
liabilities (repos, 
interbank 
lending, trading 
positions
long-term
debt
Shareholder 
j equity
Figure I.  Funding and Activities of a Typical Bank
Consider a simple bank that makes loans funded by the accounts of depositors. 
The prototypical bank deposit is a “demand” deposit, meaning that the depositor has 
the right to withdraw her money whenever she desires; this is the shortest possible 
maturity of borrowing, in that it is due and payable at any time upon the demand of 
the depositor.'6 Depositors like such flexibility, as they may suddenly need their 
money to cover unanticipated expenses, such as medical bills or other unforeseen 
liabilities. Nevertheless, despite the promise to repay the depositor on demand, the 
bank is able to turn this deposit into long-term money that it can lend to other 
individuals or businesses. So if the depositor deposits $ 100 in the bank, the bank may 
turn around and immediately lend out this $100 to a business or homebuyer for a 
much longer term (the typical mortgage, for instance, has a 30-year maturity). In this 
way, the liquidity needs of the depositor and the long-term capital needs of the bor­
rower can be met; the bank has effectively turned the depositor’s $ 100 of short-term 
cash into $ 100 of long-term assets. In the language of macroeconomics, the bank has 
increased the supply of money by $100, from $100 to $200, allowing additional 
investment and growth in the economy. ’7
What happens, however, when the depositor wants her money back? In the above 
example, the bank would be unable to call in its loan to the borrower since it is not
36. For a discussion of various funding types, including demand deposits, see Div. of 
Consumer & Cmty. Affairs, The Fed. Reserve Sys., Regulation D: Reserve Requirements, 
in Consumer Compliance Handbook (2010).
37. See N. Gregory Mankiw, Principles of Economics 630 (6th ed. 2012).
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yet due, and the bank would therefore be unable to pay its liabilities as they come 
due—the bank is insolvent, in other words. There are two things that banks do in 
tandem to avoid such an outcome. Banks, first of all, diversify across depositors, and 
second, they do not lend out all of the money that depositors deposit. This amount 
that banks hold, rather than lend, is known as reserves. The more diversified the 
depositor base, the lower the reserves that a bank must hold, and the more credit it 
can extend to borrowers. This leads to the system of “fractional reserve banking,” as 
it is known, in which banks must hold only a fraction of their deposits as reserves. 18 
Notably, this prudential measure arises even without the existence of government 
regulation. No bank that lent out too much of its deposits would stay in business long. 
But, notwithstanding banks’ incentives to remain solvent, national and international 
laws regulate the amount of cash banks must hold on hand and limit the amount of 
leverage banks can take, as described below.
Apart from diversifying depositor accounts, banks maximize the amount that they 
can safely lend by using experience and sophisticated models to predict withdrawals, 
thereby saving a bare minimum to meet demand deposit requests. Additionally, if 
banks find themselves with too few reserves, banks can typically borrow reserves 
from another entity (such as other banks, financial firms, and even the government), 
sell assets, raise more deposits, or issue securities. A problem with these stopgap 
measures is that they may not work in a systemic crisis: other institutions may be 
unwilling to lend; asset prices may have already declined, with further sales increas­
ing the downward price pressure; depositors (or other lenders) may fear losing their 
investments; and shareholders would be unwilling to commit more capital if the 
bank’s assets are less than its non-equity liabilities.
But low reserves make banks more susceptible to a bank run. A run happens when 
depositors lose confidence their money is available or will be available in the future, 
causing them to demand their money back immediately. As viewers of H’s a Wonder­
ful Life or Mary Poppins know, a bank run could wipe out a solvent bank that does 
not have the instantaneous ability to convert its illiquid assets to cash. In a sort of 
self-fulfilling prophecy, if one depositor believes that other depositors are likely to 
demand their deposits back, then it makes sense for her to demand as well, since 
otherwise, if the reserves are inadequate, she will, at best, not immediately have ac­
cess to her account, and, at worst, lose some or all of her investment. Thus, in what 
is wholly a rational panic,39 all depositors may demand their deposits back at the 
same time, even though no fundamental change has occurred at the bank.
While rational panics and bank runs may occur for no substantive reason at all, 
deficiencies in a bank’s capitalization make bank panics and bank failure more likely. 
Certainly, the amount of reserves on hand is one such important variable: as the 
likelihood of being unable to meet withdrawal needs increases, depositors and other 
creditors will be less willing to keep their money with the bank. Similarly, as the 
value of a bank’s assets (its mortgages and loans) declines, due to, say, a deterioration
38. See Mishkin & Eakins, supra note 35, at 401.
39. In the Diamond and Dybvig model, a bank’s “demand deposit contract providing 
[liquidity transformation] has an undesirable equilibrium (a bank run) in which all depositors 
panic and withdraw immediately, including even those who would prefer to leave their depos­
its in if they were not concerned about the bank failing.” Diamond & Dybvig, supra note 35, 
at 402.
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in the real estate market, the likelihood of substantive insolvency increases as well. 
Conversely, as new equity is injected into the bank, creating a cushion for depositors 
and other creditors, the likelihood of substantive insolvency lessens and bank runs 
become less likely.
The solution, developed in response to the banking crisis that triggered the Great 
Depression, is government insurance.40 To reduce the fear of a bank run, and thus to 
decrease the cash necessary to be held on hand (and therefore to increase the speed 
at which wealth can be created), the government stands behind bank deposits, 
promising to pay if the bank does not.41 The primary mechanism is guarantees of 
deposits up to $250,000 by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), which 
charges member banks a risk-adjusted premium.42 The FDIC acts on the assumption 
that if depositors know that they have assurances from the government, they have no 
need to pull out their money.4’
Yet the solution to bank runs creates another problem. Let the depositors know 
their deposits are secure, and they will care little about the prudence of their bank’s 
lending operations. The government guarantee satisfies their worries about non­
payment, no matter how badly the bank performs.44 This is the familiar moral hazard 
problem, and it inevitably leads to a less-than-optimal amount of private monitoring 
of bank risk taking. It therefore falls on the government, as it falls on every guarantor, 
to take steps to monitor the bank so that it does not engage in risky activities that 
could trigger claims against it under the guarantee. Out of the government’s need to 
control moral hazard by its banks, the system of bank regulation has been born.
Banks are also dependent on nondeposit funding. Banks may borrow from other 
banks and financial institutions, establish trading positions that may incur liabilities 
in the near future, issue longer term certificates of deposits, sell bonds, and undertake 
new stock offerings. These stakeholders do not benefit from FDIC insurance— in 
fact, because the government gives priority to FDIC-insured accounts when winding 
up banks,45 one could say that they lose from it—and hence their incentives to pull
40. See Mishkin & Eakins, supra note 35, at 456.
41. These concerns are not present, or are present to a much lesser degree, in a world in 
which banks issue bank-specific notes o f general circulation. For a discussion of a banking 
system comprised of private money, see generally Bruce D. Smith & Warren E. Weber, Private 
Money Creation and the Suffolk Banking System, 31 J. Money, Credit & Banking 624 (1999).
42. The Deposit Insurance Fund, FDIC, http://www.fdic.gov/dcposit/insurance/index 
.html | https://perma.cc/K7WU-3PEQI (last updated Nov. 29, 2016); Deposit Insurance FAQs, 
FDIC, https://www.fdic.gov/deposit%2Fdeposits/faq.hlml [https://perma.ee/9VUD-U7A8] 
(last updated June 3, 2014).
43. See, e.g., Diane Ellis, Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., Deposit Insurance Funding: 
Assuring Confidence (2013).
44. Current rules limit the amount o f deposit insurance to $250,000, hut individuals can 
evade this limit by holding accounts of up to this amount in multiple banks, each of which is 
insured for the maximum amount See Deposit Insurance FAQs, supra note 42 (“The FDIC 
covers the traditional types of bank deposit accounts— including checking and savings ac­
counts, money market deposit accounts (MMDAs), and certificates of deposit (CDs).. . .  The 
standard deposit insurance amount is $250,000 per depositor, per FDIC-insured bank, per 
ownership category.”).
45. See When a Bank Fails -  Facts fo r  Depositors, Creditors, and Borrowers, FDIC 
(Apr. 4, 2016), https://www.fdic.gov/consumers/banking/facts/priority.html [https://perma.ee
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credit from a troubled bank remain strong. In a slower-moving analog of a bank 
panic, these sorts o f various bank stakeholders may refuse to invest new funds, and 
further, may refuse to roll over (that is, renew) old debts as they come due. Lehman 
Brothers, for instance, found itself unable to roll over its short-term liabilities, largely 
securities repurchase agreements (repos), even though Lehman remained balance- 
sheet solvent.46
Thus, the problem o f bank runs poses a problem not just for actual banks, but for 
the variety of financial firms that undertake bank-like activities, so-called shadow 
banks.47 Shadow banks are dependent upon short-term liabilities to fund long-term 
assets and therefore face the very same vulnerabilities as do actual banks. Money 
market funds, some hedge funds, structured investment vehicles, and some invest­
ment banks (such as Lehman) borrow in short-term credit markets to purchase 
longer-term assets. Some of these shadow banks, such as Lehman and Reserve 
Primary Fund (the oldest money market mutual fund), did experience failures that 
were as potentially damaging to the financial system as were the actual bank failures 
that occurred.48
Given the fragility of the banking and shadow banking systems, as well as the 
important part these institutions play in the economy, it is unsurprising that they are 
highly regulated and becoming more so. There are a variety o f regulatory tools and 
approaches to optimizing the amount and type o f bank regulation, including address­
ing the problem of bank runs. We consider these in the next section.
B. Banking Regulation Basics
There are two central issues in banking regulation. The first is the moral hazard 
problem created by FDIC insurance, itself an attempt to solve the bank run problem. 
Depositors need not worry about whether the bank invests prudently and whether the 
bank is adequately capitalized. Instead, the FDIC and the federal government bear 
that risk. In other words, the solution to alleviating one sort o f risk— the rational 
panic— actually induces more risk-taking behavior on the part o f banks because more 
of the banks’ costs can be externalized onto third parties. Short of a radical change
/2CL4-YTFD] (“By law, after insured depositors are paid, uninsured depositors are paid next, 
followed by general creditors and then stockholders.”).
46. According to Lehman Brothers’ last 10-Q, filed for the second quarter of 2008, 
Lehman’s stockholders had positive equity of $26 billion. Lehman Bros. Holdings, Quarterly 
Report (Form 10-Q) 6 (May 31, 2008), http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/806085 
/000110465908045115/a08-18147_110q.htm [https://perma.ee/GTP2-WCHR].
47. See Gary Gorton and Andrew Metrick, Regulating the Shadow Banking System, 
Brookings Papers on Econ. Activity, Fall 2010, at 261-262.
48. For a full discussion, see Fin. Crisis Inquiry Comm’n, The Financial Crisis 
Inquiry Report (2011), http://fcie-static.law.stanford.edu/cdn_media/fcic-reports/fcic_final 
_report_full.pdf [https://perma.ee/SWY7-RXMWI. The introduction notes the centrality of 
the Lehman failure: “In addition, the government’s inconsistent handling of major linancial 
institutions during the crisis—the decision to rescue Bear Steams and then to place Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac into conservatorship, followed by its decision not to save Lehman 
Brothers and then to save AIG—increased uncertainty and panic in the market.” Id. at xxi.
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to our entire banking system,19 this government guarantee generates a social liability 
that means even many “small-government types” wholeheartedly support a robust 
and vigorous system o f banking regulation/0
The second is that banks are thought to generate significant externalities, both 
positive and negative, such that a bank’s owners and managers will have incentives 
that are not always in line with the best interests o f society. On the positive external­
ity side, banks play a central role in the creation of credit and the expansion of the 
money supply. The government is, to an extent, dependent on banks to help the econ­
omy run and expand, and if banks are unwilling to lend, as they were in the recent 
financial crisis, the government’s plans to kick-start the economy will be greatly 
hampered.51 Hence, a significant problem can be, at times, banks taking on too little 
risk and engaging in too little banking activity.
On the negative externality side, bank failures have consequences that may extend 
beyond the bank’s shareholders and depositors. Following a relatively conventional 
account o f systemic risk in the banking system, bank failure causes external harms 
by reducing confidence in payment systems, causing losses to counterparties who 
cannot properly calculate counterparty credit risk, and depressing asset prices as the 
bank scurries to offload its assets. These in turn can lead other banks into crisis 
(sometimes referred to as financial contagion).52 More prosaically, losses to bondholders 
and other creditors are externalities from the bank’s shareholders’ point o f view.
Thus, any system o f bank regulation must attempt to encourage a robust amount 
of banking activity— credit being the lifeblood of a modern economy—while not 
allowing banks and bank shareholders to run totally rampant, maximizing profits at 
the expense o f society as a whole.
Before considering some o f the regulatory techniques designed to solve the 
problems created by deposit insurance and other banking externalities, it is important 
to note that all o f them can be thought o f as regulating either the amount of banking 
activity (“activity level regulation”) or about how careful the bank is in its activities 
(“due care regulation”). These are the familiar objects of tort law, and therefore the
49. If bank runs are nol a systemic problem, then one could imagine a return to the private­
banking model that prevailed for much of U.S. history. Individual banks would issue currency 
whose value would depend on the market’s evaluation of the riskiness. See Thomas L. Hogan, 
Cato Inst., Competition in Currency: The Potential for Private Money (2012), http:// 
www.eato.org/publications/poliey-analysis/competition-curreney-potential-private-money [https:// 
perma.cc/3M'l'3-ALEU]; see also David Glasner, Free Banking And Monetary Reform 
(2005). We view the likelihood of such a radical change, whatever its merits, as vanishingly 
small.
50. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein & M. Todd Henderson, Do Accounting Rules Matter? 
The Dangerous Allure o f Mark to Market, 36 J. Corp. L. 513, 525 (2011) (“In this environ­
ment, the rationale for banking regulation, which even small-government types support, runs 
as follows.”).
51. See, e.g., Stephen Gandcl, Study: Bank Bailout Didn 7 Boost Small Business Lending, 
Fortune (Nov. 14, 2012), http://fortune.com/2012/ll/14/study-bank-bailout-didnt-boost 
-small-business-lending/1https://perma.ee/EBP6-SBET],
52. For an example of the application of this argument, see generally Viral V. Acharya, 
Matthew Richardson, Stun vanNif.uwerburgii& Lawrence J. White, Guaranteed To 
Fail: Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and the Debacle of Mortgage Finance (2011).
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literature on optim al regulation o f  accidents can be a useful analog in evaluating the 
efficacy o f  banking regulation.5 .
A t all levels and am ong all regulators,54 banking regulation is designed to ensure 
the “ safety and soundness” o f  banks.55 Safety and soundness are related but different 
concepts. Safety is about ensuring that depositors have a safe place to put their 
money, where they know it will not be squandered or lost due to fraud, errors o f 
judgm ent, or bad luck. Safety, or the appearance o f  safety, reduces the threat o f  bank 
runs, which benefits everyone. Soundness is about ensuring banks are well managed 
and maintain adequate levels o f  capital against losses. Although these have been the 
pillars o f  banking regulation since the Founding, there are many ways in which 
regulators can try to achieve the optim al levels o f  safety and soundness, and these 
have changed over time.
1. Prudential Regulation
From the beginning o f  the Republic and for hundreds o f  years, safety and 
soundness regulation focused prim arily on substantive regulation o f  banking prac­
tices, w hat is often called “prudential regulation.”56 Federal and state laws limited 
entry into the banking business, defined the types o f  businesses and activities banks 
could engage in,57 required approval for “fundamental changes” to bank ownership 
or activities,5S and limited lending activities, including capping loans to any one 
borrow er,59 specifying levels and types o f  interbank lending,60 and dramatically 
restricting lending to bank executives or other insiders.61
The conceit o f  this regulatory model is to impose a one-size-fits-all rule restricting 
banks from doing specific things that m ight cause their depositors losses or lead to 
reduced stability in the banking system (that is, cause losses for depositors at other 
banks). For purposes o f  perspective, it is interesting to note that this mode o f  regula­
tion— which we term a form o f ex ante regulation— used to also be the norm for 
corporation law generally. Historically, nonbank businesses had to seek governm en­
tal approval before they could engage in any type o f  business, and corporate charters
53. See, e.g., Stevf.n Shavell, Economic Analysis of Accident Law (1987).
54. Although not relevant to our analysis, it should be noted that for a variety of reasons, 
the United Stales has a dual banking system, meaning there is bank regulation at both the state 
and federal level, and banks generally have a choice between them. In addition, banking activ­
ity can take place through either a “bank” or a “thrift,” each of which has a different regulator 
at the federal and state level. This means there are at least four choices, which generates signifi­
cant amounts o f regulatory competition. This choice has traditionally made a difference on a 
number of dimensions, such as reserve requirements, capitalization standards, and branching 
rules. For a discussion of the history and structure of U.S. regulation of banks, see Richard 
Scott Carnell, Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Law of Banking and 
Financial Institutions 2-34, 62-66 (4th cd. 2009).
55. See id. at 251-67.
56. See id. at 1-25, 251-54.
57. See e g., id. at 107-28.
58. See id. at 86-91; see also 12 U.S.C. §§ 214a-215a (2012).
59. See Carnell et al., supra note 54, at 296-300.
60. See id. at 302-04.
61. See id. al 304-07.
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were bespoke, in that they restricted firm activity to enumerated areas. This system 
of ex ante regulation of corporate formation died over a hundred years ago as New 
Jersey and then Delaware liberalized chartering requirements so that businesses 
could engage in any business activity, subject only to ex post regulation, such as 
litigation.62 Rules forbidding deals with insiders also faded in favor of a disclosure 
and approval regime.6 ' The only remaining form of pervasive ex ante regulation of 
nonbank activities is in certain business activities, such as pharmaceuticals or energy 
production, where there might be potential harms that are difficult to remedy ex post. 
Even potentially dangerous consumer products are not required to get a governmen­
tal approval before they are sold; we rely on the ex post tort system of products liabil­
ity to optimize care and activity levels.
In banking, however, ex ante approval for activities persists. For example, section 
24(7) of the National Bank Act provides that banks—called “associations”—are 
permitted to engage only in the “business of banking” and any businesses “neces­
sary” to carry out the business of banking.64 The power to construe these ambiguous 
terms is delegated to the various regulatory agencies that oversee banks, such as the 
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC).65 The regulators have generally 
taken a permissive attitude, allowing banks to enter into many business activities 
tenuously related to banking. For instance, the OCC has opined, over the objections 
of incumbents in the particular industry, that banks can offer travel agency services, 
sell annuities, provide Internet transaction services, and many other things hardly 
“necessary” to the business of banking.66
As in the regulation of corporate purpose, such ex ante regulation is fraught with 
problems. Regulators deciding whether to allow a particular bank to offer travel 
agency services or sell securities, for instance, do not know how efficient or effective 
the bank will be at offering the services, how much customer demand there will be, 
whether customers will be happy with the services provided, and what the potential 
risks are from the activity. To be sure, regulators have some experience with banks 
in general and, perhaps, the activity sought to be done by the bank, but they have less 
information about private and social costs and benefits than if they waited until the 
bank started offering the service and then reevaluated. The quantity and quality of 
information is increasing in time.
62. See e.g., Charles M. Yablon, The Historical Race Competition fo r  Corporate Charters 
and the Rise and Decline o f  New Jersey: 1880-1910, 32 J. CORP. L. 323, 351 (2007).
63. Id. at 350-53. The modem Delaware rule permits transactions with insiders under 
certain circumstances, such as disclosure of the conflict and a ratification by disinterested 
shareholders. See Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 144 (1974).
64. 12 U.S.C. § 24(7) (2012). 12 U.S.C. Section 92 permits national banks to engage in 
insurance agency activities if they are “located and doing business in any place the population 
of which does not exceed five thousand.” 12 U.S.C. § 92 (2012). The purpose of this provision, 
added to the National Bank Act in 1916, appears straightforward: to provide people living in 
small towns with access to insurance agency services, which might otherwise be unavailable 
or available only on non-compctitive terms.
65. See, e.g., Cuomo v. Clearing House Ass’n, 557 U.S. 519, 522 (2009) (applying 
Chevron deference to the OCC).
66. See Carnell et al., supra note 54, at 127-73.
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There are other problems. Even if regulators had good information about the costs 
and benefits of a particular type of activity on average, it is possible, perhaps even 
likely, that the net of these differs significantly across different banks, making a one- 
size-fits-all approach both over- and underinclusive. While Bank 1 might be able to 
engage in a particular activity in a way that generates significant social welfare, Bank 
2 may not. Crucially, the regulators may not know this before Bank 1 and 2 are able 
to demonstrate it through actual practice.
Another problem is that the decision on whether to permit a particular type of 
activity will be influenced by factors unrelated to the efficiency or safety and sound­
ness questions. Regulatory capture is a well-known and significant phenomenon, 
meaning regulators may be too willing to approve activities in some cases, while too 
willing to deny them when powerful competitors use their influence.67 Importantly, 
these problems, which plague regulation at any time, may be more significant for ex 
ante regulation, since conjectures are easier to counter or disprove than facts. One 
need only observe the large number of bank frauds in, and general mismanagement 
of, thrifts during the Savings and Loan Crisis of the 1980s, as well as the shady bank­
ing practices in the mortgage industry more recently, to see the perils of relying too 
heavily on an ex ante screening mechanism to keep banking standards high.68
Finally, often the real risk for banks and from banking arises not from forays into 
unrelated fields, like insurance or travel services, but rather from core banking activi­
ties. While a small local bank might be put in peril by over-lending to a particular 
individual, chicanery by insiders, or unsuccessfully entering into unrelated busi­
nesses, in the world of large, modern banks, systemic risk is much more likely to 
arise from bad investment decisions at the macro level in the banking industry as a 
whole. As a case in point, WaMu’s losses stemmed not from exotic derivatives or 
speculative side bets, but rather from its core home lending business.69
So although these ex ante rules and requirements are still on the books, they are 
much less an important part of systemic risk regulation today. Another form of ex 
ante regulation, risk-based capital requirements, plays an increasingly important 
regulatory role. The logic of moving from regulation of business activities to capital 
requirements is straightforward. The significant information problems faced when 
determining the risk from specific activities ex ante go away when banks are free to 
do whatever they want, so long as they maintain sufficient “insurance,” in the form
67. See, e . g Steven Davidoff Solomon, The Government's Elite and Regulatory Cap­
ture, N.Y. Times: Dealbook. (June 11, 2010, 2:00 PM) https://dealbook.nytimes.com 
/2010/06/11/the-govemments-elite-and-regulatory-capturc/? r=0 [https://permacc/Z6DF-XWMG] 
(arguing that Wall Street largely shapes top-down financial regulation to benefit itself).
68. See Reinhart & Rogoff, supra note 19; Curry & Shibut, supra note 17.
69. Wash. Mut., Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 16-17 (Feb. 29, 2008), 
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/933136/000l04746908002083/a2182890zl0-k.htm 
|https://perma.cc/8V7Q-BQQ7| (WaMu’s deterioration was “primarily the result of signifi­
cant credit deterioration in the Company’s single-family residential mortgage loan portfolio 
and significant disruptions in the capital markets, including a sudden and severe contraction 
in secondary mortgage market liquidity for nonconforming residential loan products. These 
conditions also contributed to the impairment of all goodwill associated with the Company’s 
Home Loans business near the end of 2007.”).
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of minimum levels of equity capital that can be brought down without endangering 
the health of the bank’s creditors.
2. Capital and Reserve Regulation
Absent banking externalities, there would be no need for government-mandated 
capital regulation, since banks that did not keep enough cash on hand would be driven 
out of business, and banks that did not maintain an adequate amount of equity to 
cushion the losses of depositors and other creditors would not be able to raise funds. 
But the externalization problem—bank runs, government insurance, and other bank­
ing externalities—means the laissez-faire equilibrium bank behavior would not be at 
the social optimum. As noted above, private monitoring is inefficiently low given 
government insurance, which means that the market, if left alone, will reach an 
equilibrium that is privately optimal (to shareholders and bank managers), but cer­
tainly not optimal from a societal perspective.70 It is important to note that the optimal 
reserve and capital amounts will vary across firms, depending on their activities, 
experiences, skills, and other variables.
To solve the problem of inefficient market pressure, government estimates the 
optimal point and then requires all banks maintain a minimum amount of regulatory 
capital. Because the optimal reserve capital cannot sensibly be one number for large 
and small banks, regulators determine the amount of regulatory capital as a ratio of 
capital to firm size, usually determined by assets. For many years, the typical ratio 
was known as the “leverage limit,” which was the total bank capital to total bank 
assets, where, roughly speaking, bank capital is a measure of shareholder equity, 
while total bank assets is the bank’s entire portfolio of loans, mortgages, cash on 
hand, and any other investments.71 To satisfy the regulatory requirement, banks had 
to keep at least four percent of capital to assets.72 Although the ratio concept is 
straightforward, it is complicated to determine what precisely goes into total capital 
and what liabilities on (and off) the balance sheet should be considered in determin­
ing the numerator and denominator.
Putting these complexities aside, however, one can easily see the over- and 
underinclusiveness problem with using a single, ex ante leverage ratio to determine 
the optimal bank capital. Four percent will be too low for some banks, while it will 
be too high for others. To be sure, banks with greater risks may voluntarily hold more 
than four percent, but because of government insurance, whatever amount they hold 
will be less than they would hold if subjected to efficient market forces. So, although 
ex ante capital regulation has the benefit of not micromanaging bank decision making 
and substituting the judgment of bureaucrats for bankers, it suffers from a significant 
problem that faces all ex ante regulation.
The one-size-fits-all problem became a significant problem during the 1980s, as 
banks became more heterogeneous in the type of risks they were taking on.73 Greater
70. See supra Part I.A.
71. See 12 C.F.R. § 3.6 (2013); 12 C.F.R. § 6.4(b)(2)(iii) (2016); see also Carnellet 
al., supra note 54, at 256-57.
72. 12 C.F.R. § 3.6 (2013); 12 C.F.R. § 6.4(b)(2)(iii) (2016).
73. See Peter J. Wallison, Why Do We Regulate Banks?, Regulation (Winter 2005-06), 
https://object.cato.org/sites/calo.org/files/serials/files/regulation/2005/12/v28n4-2.pdf [https://
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sophistication and diversification of bank activities necessitated an approach to 
regulatory capital that recognized this change. To address risk heterogeneity, in 1988 
the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) in Basel, Switzerland, proposed a 
regulatory requirement of eight percent capital to risk-adjusted assets.74 This was a 
nod in the direction of a capital policy tailored to individual bank risks and quality, 
but because it was executed ex ante it necessarily maintained a one-sized-fits-all ap­
proach—eight percent capital for certain risks might be too much, too little, or just 
right, depending on the bank. Most countries adopted the Basel Accord (known as 
“Basel I”), including the United States.75
Other than the inclusivity problem noted above, the eight percent rule seemed to 
work well for many years, allowing some tailoring of capital requirements to bank 
risk. But by the early 2000s, regulators concluded the rule was ill suited for large 
banks operating across borders and in highly sophisticated markets. Accordingly, the 
BIS promulgated a new capital reserve regime in 2004. Basel II made many 
changes,76 but the core was permitting large, sophisticated banks to tailor their risk- 
based capital reserves by either: (1) an enumerated asset-specific risk assessment;77 
or (2) the bank’s internal risk assessment models.78 For instance, for the first ap­
proach, sovereign debt did not count toward liabilities, while 20% of exposure to the 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) banks counted, 
50% of residential mortgages, and 100% of consumer loans and other unsecured 
debt.79 Again, this adjustment to the ex ante regulatory regime was an attempt to 
tailor risk, but clearly shows the problems of blanket rules, as well as attempts to 
predict the risk of particular bank activities as general categories. For one, greater 
weighting may encourage regulatory arbitrage, as in the use of credit instruments to 
move certain risks off of bank balance sheets. In addition, as the housing bubble and 
ensuing financial crisis shows, exposure to residential mortgages was riskier than 
believed, and not all banks holding it were good ones or worthy of the same risk 
weighting.
The numerous bank failures of the past few years point to the problem of relying 
too heavily on ex ante capital requirements, especially ones linked to rating-agency-
perma.cc/8RMI-TEDR |.
74. See Basel Capital Accord (Basel I), Basel Comm, on Banking Supervision, 
Bank for Int’l Settlements, International Convergence of Capital Measurement 
and Capital Standards 14 (1988), https://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsl28b.pdf [ https://pcrma.cc 
/6RXC-KJKR|.
75. See id.
76. The three pillars of the revised Basel accord were capital (sole focus of Basel 1); mar­
ket discipline (mandatory disclosure of bank’s condition); and regulatory supervision. Basel 
Comm’n on Banking Supervision, Bank for Int’l Settlements, International 
Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards 6 (2006), http://www.bis 
.org/publ/bcbsl 28. pdf [https://perma.ee/NN5H-FSIIF],
77. One hundred percent o f government, etc. tied to rating agencies. Whoops.
78. See Basel Comm’n on Banking Supervision, supra note 76, at 19, 52. Basel II also 
added in the concept of “operational risk,” which simply meant adding in some additional 
capital as a cushion in the event of a failure in the bank’s operations, computer systems, or the 
like. Id. at 144.
79. See id.; see also Carnell ET AL., supra note 54, at 257-65 (showing how to perform 
capital calculations under the rules).
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based assessments o f risk or internal bank models. Capital, however defined, seems 
to be evidence of bank weakness after the fact, rather than a predictor o f it in advance. 
If a bank makes bad or overly risky investments, it is not until those asset prices 
actually fall that the bank shareholder equity shrinks, making it then under­
capitalized.80 Moreover, ex ante regulatory approaches such as this may generate 
false confidence that disarms whatever market pressure would otherwise exist.
3. The Regulatory Veto
Perhaps out o f recognition of these problems, the existing regulatory regime for 
banks includes an uncommon feature: regulators, called bank examiners, have the 
power to shut down bank activities midstream if the regulators believe the social 
costs are too high. We call this feature a regulatory veto, since it is a determination 
about whether existing activities should and can continue, made after they have com­
menced but before they have completed.81 After loans or investments have been 
made, bank regulators are authorized to veto a bank’s operations based on an assess­
ment o f the social welfare o f the bank’s choice about its type and amount of activi­
ties.8'  The veto can take the form o f a modification of the way the business is being 
conducted or a winding down and termination o f the business.83
For instance, if a bank decides to engage in lending concentrated in a particular 
industry or geography, the regulator could decide that the social risks are too high, 
and therefore demand the bank to stop lending, alter its origination standards, in­
crease oversight o f the portfolio, take on more capital against losses, or shut down 
the particular lending or the entire bank.84 The key virtue o f the regulatory veto is 
that it is made after a decision about whether to engage in the activity has been made 
by bankers and after regulators can observe social cost o f those activities. The idea 
is to find the point where the information about costs and benefits o f the activity in 
question is at a high point relative to the expected cost o f delay. A more efficient 
allocation o f resources may be possible because shareholders can act on their signal 
o f prospective firm value, and regulators can act based on an ex post signal o f firm 
value and riskiness.
The topology of regulatory choices is shown in Figure 2.
80. this is assuming mark-to-market accounting. In book value accounting, where banks 
do not need to write down asset values, the bank could still remain adequately capitalized for 
regulatory purposes, even though in real terms it is not. See Epstein & Henderson, supra note 
50, at 537. See also Mishkin & Eakins, supra note 35, at 410-12.
81. See, e.g., Mishkin & Eakins, supra note 35, at 433-35.
82. For a discussion of bank examiners’ powers, see Henderson & Tung, supra note 13, 
at 1021-23.
83. Id.
84. Id.
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Figure 2. Topology of Regulatory Mechanisms
The regulatory veto is designed to allow timely and tailored regulatory 
intervention. It allows information about regulatory costs and benefits to be learned 
by regulators, who are watching banks closely. The presence o f an on-site examiner 
is an opportunity for bank regulation to be different than other forms o f  regulation, 
which rely entirely on ex ante regulation, ex post regulation, or a mix thereof. Con­
sider the regulation of driving. We try to make roads safe by using a mix of speed 
limits (ex ante rules) and tort suits (ex post litigation) to produce the optimal amount 
of driving and care about driving. The blanket ex ante rules will, o f course, be over- 
and underinclusive. It would be a social welfare improvement if we could design and 
enforce rules based on the expected costs and benefits o f each driver. A racecar driver 
could easily drive faster than the speed limit with less risk than a teenager driving 
slower than it. However, it is simply too costly to write driver-specific rules, as the 
monitoring and enforcement costs would simply be too high. Narrowly tailored rules 
may be more efficient without considering the costs o f enforcement, but when they 
are considered, rules of general applicability, despite their clunkiness, may be 
superior.
But if it is possible with reasonable cost to have rules designed to optimize the 
social costs and benefits o f a particular actor, then regulation can be improved. In the 
speed limit hypothetical, if the highway patrol could have an officer riding in every 
car, then it might be possible to create local regulation that would be more efficient. 
As discussed below, the examination process for banks is just that. Examiners sit at 
banks, examining each bank’s activities for risk. If this process worked well, and we 
show it does not at present, it could allow regulators to maximize the value of regula­
tion, and therefore improve social welfare, by reducing bank activities.
Some of the details o f the examination process have been recounted in other 
works,85 but it is worth summarizing some of the specifics here. In practice, bank 
examiners work full-time monitoring large bank activities for compliance with 
regulations and established risk tolerances.86 An examination occurs once per year
85. See, e.g., id. at 1016-21.
86. Several federal agencies supervise banks: the OCC supervises national banks; the 
Federal Reserve supervises state member banks and bank holding companies; and the FDIC 
supervises state nonmember banks and FDIC-insured savings banks. See FDIC Report, supra
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for routine cases, and more often as needed based on regulators’ views o f the riski­
ness o f the bank in question.87 Many thousands o f person-hours are typically spent 
conducting the examination o f large banks.88 Examiners judge the credit quality of 
each asset, that is, each loan or investment that has been made. The assessment is 
made based on discussions with loan officers and bank managers. Examiners also 
review loan portfolios as a whole for issues such as concentration risk, violations of 
legal rules, and deviations from bank loan and underwriting policies. They also judge 
other aspects o f bank activity, such as the affairs o f subsidiaries and affiliates, litiga­
tion risks, off-balance-sheet activities, and activities o f insiders. Importantly, they do 
this all after lending decisions have been made and after loans have experienced some 
real-world conditions to put their risk into context.89
After the on-site examination is completed, the examiner first presents a report on 
bank activities to management. Bank officials are able to comment on the report and 
offer to fix any deficiencies. The report is also taken to the bank’s board o f directors, 
which can promise to take corrective action to preempt regulatory action to shut 
down bank activities that threaten systemic risk.90 For example, the decision to drop 
a bank’s CAMELSrating from 2 to 3 (moving the bank from “fundamentally sound” 
to indicating “some degree of supervisory concern”) precipitates formal or informal ac­
tions, which include obtaining the bank’s written commitment to take corrective action.91
note 13, at 463. The FDIC also has backup supervisory responsibility for monitoring the condi­
tion of national banks and state member banks. In fulfilling these responsibilities, it works 
with the other two federal regulatory agencies. Under the Financial Institutions Reform, 
Recovery, and Enforcement Act o f 1989 (F1RREA), it also has backup authority to examine 
thrift institutions as well. State banking departments supervise state-chartered banks. Id.
87. The frequency of examination varies by agency and over time. For instance, the Na­
tional Bank Act of 1864 mandated that the OCC examine all national banks twice a year but 
allowed an extension to three examinations every two years. T his policy stood until 1974, 
when the OCC moved toward off-site examinations using statistical methods, and the average 
examination schedule was more like eighteen months. With the passage of the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991 (FD1CIA), on-site examinations were re­
quired by law. By the late 1980s, resident examiners were placed in the largest multinational 
banks, and by the 1990s, larger regional banks also got resident examiners. See FDIC Report, 
supra 13, at 422-23. Similar changes were also true of FDIC and Treasury examinations. 
FDIC examination periods varied from one to three years, depending on the CAMELS rating 
of the bank in question. Like for the OCC, however, the FDICIA “mandated annual on-site 
examinations of all banks except highly rated small institutions, for which the interval could 
be extended to 18 months.” FDIC Report, supra note 13, at 425.
88. See, e.g., Henderson & Tung, supra note 13, at 1024-25.
89. See id.
90. The primary mechanism for examiner action is the bank’s CAMELS rating. Examin­
ers rate banks on a scale o f 1 (good) to 5 (bad) in each of six areas—Capital adequacy, Asset 
quality, Management, Earnings, Liquidity, and Sensitivity to market risk— and then assign a 
composite score. A score of 1 means a bank is performing far above average; 2, the most 
common score, means “fundamentally sound”; 3 means “some degree of supervisory con­
cern”; 4 means generally unsafe and unsound conditions; and 5 means severe problems and 
likely failure within one year. See Office of Thrift Supervision, OTS Examination 
Handbook Section 070 070.4-070.5 (2011).
91. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation: Uniform Financial Institutions Rating Sys­
tem, 62 Fed. Reg. 752 (Jan. 6, 1997), https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/laws/federal/ufir.pdf
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For bank activities that are determined to pose excessive risk or are otherwise not 
compliant with banking rules and regulations, examiners have enormous power to 
change bank practices. The regulatory pressure can be either explicit or implicit, 
backed by a threat of legal enforcement, including orders to curtail particular activi­
ties. For instance, section 8 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act gives various bank 
regulators vast power to curtail unsafe or unsound banking practices (that is, exces­
sively risky activities) through the use or threat o f cease and desist orders, removal 
of managers, or imposition o f civil fines.92 The threat o f formal regulatory action is 
used to pressure banks into informal accommodation o f regulatory wishes, through 
agreements known as “memoranda of understanding.”9’ When informal action is in­
effective at restricting banking excesses, regulators have the power to take formal, 
legal action. For instance, cease and desist orders are authorized where bank 
regulators believe a bank’s activities are likely to result in a “significant dissipation 
o f assets or earnings” or are likely to “weaken” the bank or “prejudice” its custom­
ers.94 Although rarely used, as we discuss and criticize below, these powers are con­
strued to be broad enough to prevent excessive risk taking by banks. The government 
report on the failure of the bank WaMu describes the examiner role this way: “ [The 
regulator] is responsible for monitoring an institution’s risk to the [the taxpayers]. 
[The regulator] had authority to perform its own examination o f WaMu and impose 
enforcement action to protect the [the taxpayers].”95
The on-site examination process is meant to take place after loans happen but 
before it is too late. The examination process is designed to “ identify the risk o f fail­
ure in troubled institutions in sufficient time for supervisors to take corrective action” 
and therefore avoid social losses that cannot be remedied through traditional ex post 
litigation processes.96 Another important tool available to examiners is a follow-up 
enforcement action, which is designed to “control the risk-taking behavior o f prob­
lem banks after they have been identified.”97 Thus, banking regulation is not so much 
about preapproval for a decision to make a particular loan or type o f loan, but rather 
an ongoing check on whether the lending decisions that have been made are accepta­
ble from a social welfare standpoint. If they are not, the examiners have the power 
to force the bank to change its underwriting policies or raise additional money (that 
is, buy insurance against failure).
The regulatory veto is rare in law, but, as discussed below, we believe it is the 
essential feature of banking regulation. Why give bank regulators the power to con­
trol business activities and even shut down entire firms? In the model of regulation 
we develop, the regulatory veto may be necessary if other forms of regulation are 
insufficient to optimize the amount of firm activity because o f ex ante information
[https://perma.cc/2UFK-CWVRI. I'his written commitment commonly comes in the form of 
a board resolution creating a Memorandum ofUnderstanding between the bank and the regula­
tor. See FD1C Report, supra note 13, at 473.
92. See 12 U.S.C. § 1818 (b), (e), (i)(2) (2012).
93. See supra note 9 1.
94. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 1818(c)(1) (2012).
95. WaMu Report, supra note 11, at 35.
96. FDIC Report, supra note 13, at 439.
97. Id. at 432.
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deficiencies. We consider the various regulatory options, including no regulation, ex 
post litigation, and the banking analog of command-and-control regulation, showing 
why they are insufficient to maximize the value of banking. We then show why add­
ing the regulatory veto option can improve social welfare, but point out how it is 
commonly used in a suboptimal way that perversely undercuts its purpose.
C. Regulatory Reform Proposals
Commentators have offered a variety of explanations for the failure of bank 
regulation, having to do with issues such as the incentives of bank CEOs, banks being 
“too big to fail,” and the failure of bankers, customers, and regulators to understand 
new financial products. Each of these alleged causes have generated reform pro­
posals targeted at a specific alleged cause. Crucially, all of them fall into either the 
ex ante or ex post methods of regulation. In the ex ante category are restrictions on 
executive pay to change banker incentives to engage in particular activities, limita­
tions on the size of banks (including the so-called Volcker Rule), new disclosures 
required for specific products, and a proposed requirement for government 
preapproval of financial products. In the ex post category are new rules requiring 
claw backs for certain monies paid to executives before accounting restatements, in­
creased insurance requirements (in the form of convertible capital, for instance), and 
calls by many for more civil and even criminal cases against banks for the losses 
suffered by borrowers and taxpayers.
A series of recent papers focuses on ex ante incentives of bankers. Sanjai Bhagat 
and Roberta Romano propose paying bank CEOs with more long-term equity; 
specifically, that all-equity options vest only after the CEO has left the bank.98 Lucian 
Bebchuk and Holger Spamann propose changing the mix of CEO pay to include more 
debt in order to give bank CEOs better down-side risk incentives.99 They want banks 
to do less of certain types of activities and propose achieving this by changing the 
rewards CEOs get from engaging in them.1110 In a friendly amendment, Fred Tung 
has proposed paying bankers in part with the publicly held subordinated debt securi­
ties of individual banks.101 His argument is that the Bebchuk and Spamann proposal, 
which pays in the debt of bank parents (known as “bank holding companies” 
(BHCs)), would offer a noisy signal of the expected downside of particular risk tak­
ing.102 He argues that paying in subordinated debt issued by individual banks, rather 
than their BHC parents, would offer better ex ante incentives for optimal risk tak­
ing. 102 These proposals are supported by empirical research done by Tung, along with
98. Sanjai Bhagat & Roberta Romano, Reforming Executive Compensation: Focusing 
and Commuting to the Long-Term, 26 Yale J. ON Reg. 359 (2009). This proposal is similar 
to one made more generally by the authors. See M. Todd Henderson & James C. Spindler, 
Corporate Heroin: A Defense o f  Perks, Executive Loans, and Conspicuous Consumption, 93 
Geo.L.J. 1835 (2005).
99. Lucian A. Bebchuk & I lolger Spamann, Regulating Bankers ’ Pay, 98 Geo. L.J. 247 (2009).
100. See id. at 249-51.
101. See Frederick lung, Pay fo r  Banker Performance: Structuring Executive Compensa­
tion fo r  Risk Regulation, 105 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1205 (2011).
102. Id. at 1208, 1244-48.
103. Id. at 1229-34.
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coauthor Xue Wang, finding that bank CEOs with greater amounts o f compensation 
contingent of bank solvency (e.g., deferred compensation) took less risk than other 
bank CEOs during the run up to the great financial crisis.'04
A different set o f papers focuses on the incentives o f regulators. Fred Tung and 
one o f the authors propose paying bank examiners with a mix of the equity and debt 
o f the banks they regulate in order to improve their incentives to take actions to opti­
mize bank regulation and to intervene where necessary to limit bank losses.105 In a 
follow-on paper, they propose improving examiner incentives further by using an 
auction method to allocate regulatory resources.106 Under their proposal, examiners 
would choose banks to regulate, rather than the other way around, thereby helping to 
ensure a better fit, to ensure the production o f more information about bank risk, and 
to discourage regulatory capture. These proposals are the most related to the argu­
ment we present in this Article, since they focus not on ex ante or ex post regulation 
of banks, but instead on the incentives of regulators. As discussed below, our argu­
ment identifies regulatory failure as the primary source o f recent banking failures, 
and highlights the need to improve regulatory design.
Focusing instead on ex ante restrictions on bank size, law professor Jonathan 
Macey and banker James Holdcroft, Jr. propose limiting the size of banks in order to 
reduce the costs o f individual bank failure.107 They argue that the only way the 
government can credibly commit to not bailing out banks that take excessive risks is 
to break them up so that failure is an option. Their proposal would prohibit any bank 
from amassing liabilities that exceed five percent of the value o f the FD1C insurance 
fund.108 According to James Kwak, coauthor o f 13 Bankers: The Wall Street Take­
over and the Next Financial Meltdown, as o f 2010, this would limit the size o f any 
bank’s liabilities to $3 billion, meaning the proposal would break up “over two hun­
dred’’ banks.109 (The asset-limiting proposal in 13 Bankers is timid in comparison, 
proposing to break up only the six banks larger than $270 billion.)110 The chief virtue 
of the Macey and Floldcroft proposal is that it takes advantage of the private infor­
mation held by bankers about their efficiency at engaging in certain activities. They 
argue that their approach “does not require any restrictions on activities of banks or 
on the location o f those activities of any kind.” 1" At the same time, their one-size-
104. Frederick 'l ung & Xue Wang. Bank CEOs, Inside Debt Compensation, and the Global 
Financial Crisis 27 (Bos. Univ. Sch. of Law, Working Paper No. 11-49, 2011).
105. See Henderson & Tung, supra note 13, at 1008.
106. See M. l odd Henderson & Frederick Tung, Reverse Regulatory Arbitrage: An Auc­
tion Approach to Regulatory Assignments, 98 IOWA L. Rf,V. 1895, 1898-99 (2013).
107. See Macey & IJoldcroft, supra note 26, at 1370-71.
108. See id. at 1371.
109. Simon Johnson & James Kwak, 13 Bankers: The Wall Street Takeover and the
Next Financial Meltodwn (2011); see also James Kwak, S3 Billion Banks, The Baseline 
Scenario (Apr. 26, 2011), http://baselinescenario.com/20ll/04/26/3-billion-banks/
[https://perma.cc/5V5S-2CN3l (“Their proposed limit is 5 percent of the FDIC Deposit 
Insurance Fund, which itself is 1.15 percent of total insured deposits, so the limit would work 
out to $3 billion as of 2010.”).
110. See Johnson & Kwak, supra note 109.
111. Macey & Holdcroft, supra note 26, at 1404.
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fits-all proposal would result in “ lost economies o f scale,” but they believe these 
would be “offset by the . . .  savings realized by avoiding future bailouts.” 112
A related proposal—the so-called Volcker Rule— would limit banks from using 
their own cash to engage in certain types o f investments to discourage risk tak ing ."3 
The rule would apply to all banks, regardless o f their financial position, skill, history, 
or any other factor relevant to their ability to efficiently engage in this type o f activ­
ity. In other words, these proposals apply a one-size-fits-all limit on the amount of 
activity any bank can engage in, regardless o f its quality.
Even more aggressively, Eric Posner and Glen Weyl propose an FDA for financial 
products to prescreen financial products along the dimension of social welfare. This 
proposal envisions government agents assessing the value and potential cost o f bank 
activities before the bank engages in them.
Each o f these proposals (except Henderson and Tung’s focusing on regulators) 
shares three things in common. First, they are all attempts to reduce bank activity 
levels, either in general or in specific types of activities. Second, all of these proposed 
reforms amount to command-and-control regulation designed to substitute the judg­
ment o f “experts” in government for the judgment o f the managers, shareholders, 
creditors, and customers o f banks. Finally, all involve regulatory decisions being 
made with regard to neither a bank’s profit opportunities nor regulators’ information 
about systemic risks created by bank activities.
The reform proposals discussed above have little promise for limiting systemic 
risk. Some o f them simply do not address the root causes excessive risk taking, and 
several o f those that do are likely to be overly burdensome on productive banking 
activity and the economy in general. In other words, the reforms will either not work 
or err too far on the side o f constraining bank activities at the expense of social 
welfare.
* * *
As we show in the next section, these modes o f regulation have problems. All of 
ex ante regulation is faced with either a problem o f ineffectiveness or limited infor­
mation and overbroadness. Ex post measures are hampered by judgment proofness 
and uninsurability due to systemic risk. The regulatory veto, while promising as a 
means o f increasing the information available to regulators and allowing bank-by­
bank application o f prudential rules, suffers from a serious structural problem that, 
in its current form, renders it ineffective.
II. A Simple Model of Regulation of Bank Risk Taking
In this part, we offer a simple model to examine the various regulatory choices 
available to regulators and explore the strengths and weaknesses o f each. As it turns 
out, there are serious shortcomings of ex ante and ex post regulation, as well as the 
regulatory veto.
112. Id. at 1368.
113. For a good summary of the Volcker Rule, see generally William J. Sweet, Jr. & Brian 
D. Christiansen, The Volcker Rule, Skadden (July 9, 2010) https://www.skadden.com 
/newsletters/FSR_The_Volcker_Rule.pdf [https://perma.ee/KYJ8-WAAB].
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Ex post measures of risk regulation (namely, postharm litigation and mandatory 
preharm insurance) will not work, because it is in precisely those cases where risk 
materializes as reality that the firm will be insolvent and unable to pay. Insurance, a 
common solution to the judgment-proofness problem, is ineffective because systemic 
risks are likely to put unbearable pressure on insurance companies.
Ex ante regulation avoids the problem of judgment-proof banks. However, all 
forms of ex ante regulation of banking activity suffer from a severe informational 
problem: the regulator acting ex ante does so based on limited information in 
prescribing what actions may be taken and does not take into account information it 
may subsequently learn about the firm’s production and potential systemic risk. In 
addition, ex ante regulation is typically of a one-size-fits-all variety and fails to allow 
for heterogeneity among firms, financial products, and customer needs. As a result, 
ex ante regulation of banking activity is unlikely to yield the optimal level of banking 
activity. It will either prove ineffective and gameable by industrious banks, or else 
be a significant drain on both the banking sector and the wider economy. These prob­
lems are generally true of all the forms of ex ante regulation we identify: size limits, 
prudential regulation, financial transactions taxes, command-and-control, and 
incentive-based approaches.
In addition, as we show, some forms of ex ante regulation are poorly designed to 
limit systemic risk. For instance, prudential regulation, such as the capital adequacy 
ratios required under the Basel Accords, does little to prevent systemic risk taking. 
Prudential regulation may serve a purpose in protecting the financial firm’s creditors: 
it constrains borrowing (and hence activity levels) relative to the amount of equity 
shareholders have at risk in the firm. By construction, however, prudential regulation 
based only on debt/equity ratios does not guard against systemic risk or externalities 
outside of the firm’s direct stakeholders, and hence cannot generate optimal social 
welfare incentives.
We then turn to what we call the regulatory veto—the system of bank examination 
and the bank examiner’s power to shut down a bank based on examination results. 
Unlike the other forms of ex post regulation, litigation and insurance, the regulatory 
veto is not subject to the problem of judgment proofness because it does not wait for 
the harm to actually occur. Unlike ex ante regulation, the regulator does not prescribe 
limits on banking activities, and is able to wait and consider additional information 
before making a decision on letting the bank operate or shutting it down before 
greater harm is incurred. In other words, ex ante regulation happens too soon, while 
ex post regulation happens too late. The regulatory veto could be, as Goldilocks said, 
just right.
Unfortunately, as we then show, the regulatory veto has a serious structural 
problem: by allowing the bank to move first, the regulator finds itself subject to a 
form of the ultimatum game, and hence may accept banking activities that are, on 
net, harmful to society. Hence, the regulatory veto will require some fixes to work 
well, a problem we turn to in Part IV.
A. The Model
To explore how banking regulation works—or, as it largely turns out, does not 
work—we utilize a simple economic model. Our model economy consists of (i) a 
bank (or, equivalently, a financial firm engaged in shadow banking), (ii) the bank’s
1586 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 92:1559
shareholder, who manages the firm and earn its profits, (iii) the bank’s creditors, who 
provide much o f its working capital, and (iv) the regulator, who may undertake 
various sorts o f regulatory measures to attempt to maximize social welfare. The crux 
o f the model is that equity holders (and, to some extent, the firm’s bondholders) have 
an interest in taking more risk than is optimal from a societal standpoint, owing to 
the limited downside o f both debt and equity holders.
One criticism o f the model, which we point out here at the beginning, is that there 
is no separate manager; in contrast, this is a banking firm without agency cost, run 
completely in line with the shareholders’ interests. We omit a measure o f  agency cost 
for two reasons. The first is to demonstrate how pernicious the problem o f bank 
shareholder incentives are with regard to excessive risk taking: even without 
assuming bad bank executives (a common refrain heard in the wake o f the financial 
crisis), we show that exactly the same excessive risk-taking behavior is to be 
expected. The second reason to omit agency cost is that it s ign ifican t complicates 
the analysis— among other things, the manager can sometimes be turned usefully 
against the shareholders— and is deserving o f its own treatment, which we do in a 
separate paper (or papers) in which we examine various proposals to regulate bank 
manager pay.
1. The Banking Firm and Its Projects
Our bank or financial firm is funded with some amount D o f debt and an amount 
e o f equity. The firm uses this capital to invest in financial assets. For simplicity and 
concreteness, we will suppose that each project costs a dollar. However, banking 
projects vary in the following ways. First, there are two general types o f banking 
projects, low- and high-risk projects, denoted as / and h projects, respectively. These 
projects are essentially coin flips o f  varying amounts. We will assume that each of 
the / and h projects has a binary distribution, and that all o f the projects are perfectly 
correlated with one another.1"  Only a certain number o f each type o f project is 
profitable: the first nL o f the low-risk projects pay off either $2 + nL or nL in the case 
o f success or failure, respectively, with the probability o f success/failure at 50%. The 
remainder o f the low-risk projects pay off only $2 or $0, so that their expected 
profitability is zero.
Similarly, the first nh high-risk projects pay off $3 + nh or -$1 + nh for 
success/failure with probability 50%. These first nh projects have an expected value 
o f nh, while all the other high-risk projects have an expected value o f zero.
Both the number of projects that are profitable (nl and nh) and their degree of 
profitability (nL and nh) are random variables whose distribution is common 
knowledge. The firm and its shareholder observe the realization o f these variables 
prior to undertaking any banking activity. The regulator, in contrast, knows only the 
distributions of these variables ex ante, though over time the regulator may gain more
114. While perfect correlation across all projects is certainly an unrealistic assumption, it 
qualitatively changes little in our analysis. The addition of more projects, whether perfectly 
correlated or independent, always increases the bank’s overall riskiness. In a prior draft, we 
assumed imperfectly correlated normal distributions for bank projects; results there differ little 
from here.
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information about their realizations. In short, it is socially beneficial for the bank to 
undertake a certain number of banking projects; beyond that, however, all the the 
bank does is increase risk, both for its security holders and, as we discuss below, for 
the society in general.
2. Shareholders
There is a single-unit shareholder who both owns and runs the bank. The 
shareholder has some private wealth endowment of e which she may invest in either 
banking or nonbanking projects. Nonbanking projects pay a market rate of return of 
r, while banking endeavors are allowed to vary according to the level and type of 
investment.
Payoffs to the shareholder are not the same as the firm’s expected value, owing 
to the option character of equity: in a firm with limited liability, equity holders 
effectively have the option to purchase the firm’s realized cash flows for the value 
of the oustanding debt. Notably, shareholders are free to walk away from a firm that 
creates even catastrophic financial injury to others.
3. Bank Creditors
The bank’s capital structure also includes creditors, who have limited upside and 
no control rights over the actions of the banks. Creditors, instead, can only discipline 
the bank by withholding their credit from it. Depositors, for instance, who believe a 
bank is poorly managed or undercapitalized such that depositors fear for their 
deposits, will rationally run on the bank—causing it to shut down. Bondholders, 
similarly, will refuse to lend new funds to the bank and refuse to roll over term debts 
as they come due. Counterparties (those who engage in transactions such as securities 
repurchase agreements and proprietary trading with the bank) may also choose to 
stop doing business with the bank, robbing it of a source of short-term funds.
Unfortunately, the monitoring abilities or incentives of these creditors may be 
severely limited. Depositors, who are covered by FDIC insurance, have no incentives 
to run on a poorly run or undercapitalized bank. Bondholders lend for a term to the 
bank, and hence have limited ability to get their funds back as conditions change. 
More controversially, perhaps, the counterparties of a bank may not be able to 
monitor the bank’s creditworthiness due to the complexities of the trades or the 
anonymity of the short-term money markets.115
What all this means is that the bank’s cost of capital, at least in the short term, 
will not reflect the actual risks that the bank imposes on its creditors. Depositors 
simply do not care; counterparties do not always know with whom they are dealing, 
and bondholders have limited ability to act in the short term. Banks and their 
shareholders, then, have the ability to externalize much of their costs from risky 
activities onto their creditors.
115. Viral Acharya & Alberto Bisin, Counterparty Risk Externality: Centralized Versus 
Over-The-Counter Markets, 149 J. ECON. Theory 153, 154-55 (2014).
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4. The Regulator and Systemic Risk
Banking activity is governed in some way by a banking regulator who acts to 
maximize total societal welfare."6 Bank regulation is required in order to limit the 
externalities that the bank and its shareholder can impose on others. Ordinarily, of 
course, one would think that externalities imposed on creditors require no 
government intervention: the firm’s cost of capital simply rises, as creditors with 
rational expectations demand a higher return of banks that take on additional risks or 
undesirable projects, or, alternatively, they require some monitoring and control 
rights, such as a seat on the board, to manage the firm concordantly with their 
interests. However, as discussed above,"7 these creditors do not necessarily have the 
ability to fend for themselves: the FDIC does not get to choose where depositors put 
their deposits, counterparties may not be able to sufficiently analyze their trades and 
the bank’s creditworthiness,"8 and even bondholders may be subject to short-term 
expropriation.
Additionally, and perhaps more importantly, is the concept of systemic risk. The 
failure of a bank may lead to consequences far beyond just the bank’s various 
security holders. Banks are always lending to one another in the money markets, such 
that the failure of one bank imposes losses on another. Banks often invest in the same 
sorts of assets, such as residential mortgages. When a bank fails and attempts to sell 
its assets, prices may be pushed lower in a form of “fire sale,” impacting other banks’ 
balance sheets and forcing them to sell assets as well."9 This is sometimes referred 
to as financial contagion; though the existence and mechanics of financial contagion 
and fire sales are controversial issues, the conventional wisdom is currently that they 
exist and do impose significant losses on society.120 In any event, problems at one 
bank may implicate or even infect other banks, leading the whole sector downward.
Finally, banks play integral roles in the modern economy. Producers rely on banks 
for working credit and to finance capital investments. Homeowners (and the real 
estate industry) depend upon banks to finance home building and sales. Consumers 
rely on banks for payments systems. And the entire economy relies upon bank 
lending to maintain the money supply. The failure of a significant portion of the 
banking industry, therefore, significantly harms the wider economy, as it appears to 
have done in the recent financial crisis.121 The fact that such significant externalities
116. Regulators may be motivated by private interests as well. See M. Todd Henderson, 
The Changing Demand for Insider Trading Regulation, in Research Handbook on Insider 
Trading 230 (Stephen M. Bainbridge ed., 2013).
117. See supra Part 11.A.3.
118. See, e.g., Nils Beier, Holger Harreis, Thomas Poppensieker, Dirk Sojka & Mario 
I’haten, Getting to Grips with Counterparty Risk (McKinsey & Co., Working Papers on Risk 
No. 20, 2010).
119. Douglas W. Diamond & Raghuram G. Rajan, Fear o f Fire Sales, Illiquidity Seeking, 
and Credit Freeze, 126 Q.J. Econ. 557, 557-59 (2011).
120. For an analysis and survey of fire sales, see Andrei Shleifer & Robert Vishny, Fire 
Sales in Finance and Macroeconomics, J. Econ. Persp., Winter 2011, at 29.
121. It is not universally accepted that the financial crisis caused the ensuing recession. For 
example, Tyler Cowcn argues that reductions in productivity is a key factor that explains the 
great recession. See generally, Tyler Cowen, The Great Stagnation (2011); see also
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exist, and are so widespread in scope so as to affect the entire national (and, 
potentially, international) economy, implies that a regulatory solution at the national 
level is desirable.
In our model, then, we consider the bank’s systemic risk that it externalizes onto 
the wider economy and allow the regulator to take this systemic risk into account 
when deciding upon regulatory strategy. Specifically, we assume that the amount of 
systemic risk (which is, for our purposes, the expected harm imposed on society by 
the bank), which we denote as a function of the number of low- and high-risk projects 
undertaken, R(l,h), is increasing in the actual portfolio risk of the bank and at an 
increasing rate (formally, R">0, R">0) .  That is, the marginal effect of each project 
on overall systemic risk is increasing. Adding a project to a bank with few projects 
has little effect on systemic risk, since the bank is relatively solvent in the event that 
the project fails. In contrast, adding an additional project to an already heavily 
invested bank may well be the straw that breaks the camel’s back and may go further 
by causing losses at other banks and in the wider economy. One possibility, which 
we discuss later on,122 is the possibility that activities at one bank affect the systemic 
risk created by activities at another bank; for instance, an additional investment in 
sub-prime mortgages creates more risk given that other banks are already heavily 
invested in the area.
With this in mind, our regulator in the model may undertake any of several forms 
of regulation with the goal of maximizing expected overall social welfare. This 
includes the gains and losses of the shareholder, creditors, and the wider society— in 
the form of systemic risk, R. We can make this problem somewhat simpler; given the 
creditors’ investment, creditors’ expected losses are shareholders’ expected gains 
given the expropriative nature of risk taking in this model. Hence, the regulator seeks 
to maximize the sum of the bank’s expected profits less the systemic risk that bank 
imposes on society.
We consider three classes of possible regulatory actions: ex post litigation and 
insurance covergage, ex ante direct activity level restrictions, and ex post 
intervention to shut down the bank's activities (at a cost) after shareholders and bank 
managers have made their choices. An additional class of regulation—mandated 
executive compensation characteristics—we leave to a future project, as it requires a 
consideration of the more complicated agency cost problem.
B. How Do the Various Alternatives Fare?
In this section we consider the operation of our model firm and economy under 
several modes of regulation, drawing from both the law and economics literature and 
current modes of bank governnace.
Jeffrey A. Miron & Natalia Rigol, Bank Failures and Output During the Great Depression 
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 19418, 2013), http://www.nber.org 
/papers/w 19418.pdf | https://perma.cc/.IJ5M-PW6Q].
122. See infra Part II.B.3.
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1. A Baseline: Laissez-faire
As a baseline, consider the laissez-faire case in which regulators do nothing, 
allowing private individuals or firm s to act in their own interest. This approach has 
some appeal, relying, as it does, on private m arket participants to act on their own 
information according to their preferences. Shareholders, managers, creditors, and 
counterparties make their own investment decisions to maximize private gains.
The effectiveness o f  this laissez-faire approach depends heavily, however, on 
whether there are any potential costs generated by the activity that are not fully 
internalized by the individual or firm, and therefore not priced by the market. W ithout 
an internalizing mechanism and in the presence o f  Coasian transactions costs,123 
negative externality-generating products and activities will receive too much invest­
ment. A polluting factory is the prototypical exam ple, since a factory that can force 
local farmers to bear som e o f  the costs o f  production will overproduce relative to the 
social optim al. In this way, excessive bank activity leading to system ic risks can be 
thought o f  as a sort o f  financial pollution.
Given any level o f  debt investm ent in the bank’s capital, the shareholder will tend 
to choose a higher level o f  banking activity than is optimal. Consider a specific case 
where the bank has FDIC-insured deposits o f  $ 10, the shareholder has an endowment 
o f  $2, and the m arket rate o f  return is 0%. There are ten each o f  high-risk and low- 
risk projects available to the bank. Further, the shareholder knows that the first three 
low- and high-risk projects carry with them an expected profit o f  $0.20 (i.e., n , = 
n h = 3, ni = n h = $0.20), and each low-risk project increases expected social costs 
(in term s o f  system ic risk) by $0.08, while each high-risk project increases expected 
social costs by $0.16 (i.e., dR/dl = $0.08, dR/dh = $0.16). In such a case, the social 
optimum is attained by undertaking all six o f  the profitable projects, which yields 
aggregate returns to the bank’s shareholders and debtholders o f  $1.20, and expected 
costs due to system ic risk o f  $0.72, for an overal social return o f  $0.58.
Unfortunately, absent regulation o f  some sort, the shareholder will not undertake 
the socially optim al set o f  projects. In the event that the projects fail (and recall that, 
by assumption, they either all succeed or all fail), the shareholder w inds up with zero, 
since the assets o f  the bank will be insufficient to fully reim burse the creditors (here, 
the FD IC ).1-4 This means that the shareholder enjoys the upside on risky projects, 
but is indifferent to the degree o f  failure that the bank may experience. So, for the 
first three low- and high-risk projects, the shareholder’s expected payoff is 50%  x 
($2 +  $0.20) =  $1.10 and 50% x ($3 + $0.20) = $ 1.60 on each project, respectively.
123. A potential market solution, following Coase, is for those injured by the externality 
to contraet with the injurer to refrain from the harmful conduet. See R. H. Coase, The Problem 
o f  Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 6-8 (I960). In general, where benefits or harms are dispersed, 
the large costs associated with collective action and contracting make market solutions o f this 
sort unlikely. Further, such solutions typically rely on enforceable contracts.
124. One can verily this by noting that in the event o f failure, for any number of projects 
undertaken that is greater than the equity investment (i.e., h + l > e), the revenues will be 
insufficient to repay the full $10 of debt. And, clearly, the shareholder would, in these circum­
stances, always choose to invest the full amount o f debt capital—the upside is essentially free 
to the shareholder in this case; the choice of how much equity to contribute, in contrast, de­
pends on the project parameters.
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For all other projects such that / + h < 10, the shareholder’s payoff is $1 and $1.50 
for low- and high-risk projects, respectively. The hierarchy of investment, then, is 
the profitable high-risk projects (expected gross payoffs to the shareholder o f $ 1.60), 
the nonprofitable high-risk projects ($1.50), the profitable low-risk projects ($1.10), 
and, finally, the nonprofitable low-risk projects ($1). The shareholder will undertake 
all ten high-risk projects and two of the three low-risk profitable projects. The 
shareholder’s expected net payoff from this is 3 x $1.60 + 7 x $1.50 + 2 x $1.10 — 
$10 -  $2 = $5.50. Overall social welfare is, however, negative, at 3 * $0.20 + 2 x 
$0.20 -  10 x $0.16 -  2 x $0.08 = -$0.76.
Two things are apparent from this example. First, the shareholder will engage in 
too much risk overall: even if all the profitable projects are used up, there is an 
incentive to simply maximize the option value o f equity’s limited liability. Second, 
because of the shareholder’s benefit from risk, the shareholder may even choose to 
pass up profitable projects in order to engage in unprofitable risk-seeking strategies.
2. Ex Post: Litigation and Insurance
Because banking is widely thought to generate significant negative externalities, 
ex post litigation— analogous to tort causes of action in the pollution context— is 
available to force parties who act in socially costly ways to bear the costs o f doing 
so. After the harm has been done, injured parties may sue to recover their losses from 
the offending bank.125
Ex post litigation has the virtue of keeping regulatory interference to a minimum 
and avoiding decisions based on limited information, and is a common regulatory 
option for that reason. For instance, to evaluate the social welfare o f the design of 
nearly all consumer products, we use ex post litigation (that is, tort law) instead of 
preapproval by government bureaucrats. This choice reflects the fact that the ex­
pected costs of preapproval (that is, decision costs plus error costs) are extremely 
high in light of the lack of information held by regulators ex ante. Regulators do not 
know, for instance, the products or features consumers will demand, the products 
producers will be able to design and manufacture efficiently, or the social costs o f 
products before they are made and used. In the banking context, while a regulator 
may suspect that a financial firm’s activities impose a social cost of $10 approxi­
mately half the time, absent other concerns, it would be preferable for the regulator 
to simply wait to see whether the harm actually materializes, and o f what magnitude 
it is, before assigning liability.
This is true in other areas of financial regulation as well. Take securities law. For 
many years, state laws, known as “Blue Sky Laws,” authorized state securities 
regulators to prescreen securities issued by private firms to see whether or not they 
were reasonable investments for citizens o f the particular state.126 The information
125. For instance, in August 2011, Bank of America agreed to pay $8.5 billion to settle a 
suit brought by disappointed mortgage investors. Nelson Schwartz, Bank o f America Settle­
ment Faces Growing Challenges, N.Y. T imes: DealBook (Aug. 30, 2011, 7:39 PM), http:// 
dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/08/30/homeowners-scck-to-block-bank-of-amcrica-settlemcnl/ [https:// 
perma.ee/D6J5-Y56V].
126. See, eg.. Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Origin o f the Blue Sky Laws, 70 
Tex. L. Rf.v. 347, 348—49 (1991) (describing Blue Sky Laws and offering a public choice
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problem o f ex ante regulation is plain, since assessments about the riskiness o f a 
security or a particular firm are famously difficult to make. The recent experiences 
with the Internet stock bubble and the credit derivative bubble that led to the financial 
crisis are ready examples of the errors that can be made in trying to evaluate values 
and risk ex ante. It was perhaps this problem that led to the New Deal Congress that 
passed the federal securities laws to reject so-called “merit” regulation, relying on ex 
post litigation (primarily on fraud and disclosure-related causes o f action) to give 
issuers o f securities proper incentives.127 In addition, state merit regulation has 
largely died,128 as the costs of prescreening (that is, decision costs plus error costs) 
are thought to be unnecessary, given the private incentives and availability of ex post 
sanctions.
There are two major shortcomings o f ex post liability. First, if the injured parties 
are diffuse and have relatively small stakes, then the costs o f bringing a lawsuit may 
be prohibitive. This is likely true in cases o f environmental harm, where many people 
may be injured slightly by pollution, and in banking, where a bank failure may impact 
thousands o f depositors. There are mechanisms for coordinating litigation and reduc­
ing these costs, including class action litigation and government-brought cases. But 
it may be more efficient to rely on ex ante regulation, such as limits on emissions, 
cap and trade systems, or bans, depending on the economic, political, and practical 
circumstances o f the particular case.
Second, the injurer must be able to pay any judgment in order to internalize the 
social costs o f the activity. Where an actor is likely to be bankrupt when the injury 
occurs, or be bankrupted by the injury, the actor will not expect to bear the full costs 
o f the injury, and will therefore engage in a supra-optimal level of the injuring activ­
ity. The problem is often more acute when the harming party is a firm: shareholders, 
who are protected by limited liability, may prefer projects with high insolvency risks, 
since the shareholder has, effectively, an option to purchase the firm’s cash flows for 
the price o f the outstanding debt. Hence, in industries where the risks are great and 
losses are often very large, as in pharmaceuticals and banking, we expect tort liability 
to be displaced or complemented by other regulation.
Judgment proofness is clearly a problem in our banking model. The firm will be 
insolvent and unable to pay creditors and injured third parties in the event o f  severe 
financial injury to others. While presumably the FD1C would be able to sue for its 
losses, and the federal government would similarly be able to attach assets to cover 
bailout or other such taxpayer costs, this will generally happen too late, after the bank 
has gone bust. In the numerical example above, for instance, the bank undertakes ten 
high-risk and two low-risk projects. In the event that the bank goes bust, the bank’s 
net assets will be the 5 x $0.20 = $1 produced by the five profitable projects (three
explanation for their passage).
127. For a discussion of the regulatory choices and environment surrounding the passage 
of the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, see Joel Seligman, 
The Transformation of Wall Street 39-123 (3d ed. 2003).
128. The National Securities Market Improvement Act of 1996 amended section 18 of the 
Securities Act of 1933 to preempt state Blue Sky Laws regarding a specific class of “covered 
securities,” including securities traded on national exchanges. National Securities Market 
Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-290, 110 Stat. 3416 (codified as amended at 15 
U.S.C. § 78 (2012)).
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high-risk and two low-risk) less the 10 x -$1 =  —$ 10 losses caused by the failure o f 
the ten high-risk projects, for a net value o f  -$ 9 . Absent the problem o f  FDIC 
insurance, this would not be all too concerning, as creditors would have bargained 
for either controls or an interest rate that gives them an expectation o f  at least 
breaking even. In addition, however, the bank will have generated $1.76 in expected 
costs due to increased systemic risk— which, when realized, could be much higher. 
The bank, now insolvent, is clearly in no position to repay either its tort or contractual 
creditors.
One com mon regulatory response to the judgm ent-proofness problem is to require 
insurance.129 The regulator can mandate that the potential bad actor pay premiums to 
a regulated intermediary, who in return guarantees the actor’s specified liabilities.130 
Another option is to require bonding by the firm. The regulator can require the actor 
to set aside money or assets in a segregated account that can be attached in the event 
o f  subsequent injury to o thers.131 Either m easure am ounts to a precom m itm ent by the 
insured or bonder to pay future judgm ents, at least up to a specified amount. Bonding 
imposes costs directly on the actor, while insurance requires oversight by the insurer 
to promote optimal behavior; the insurance actuarial process ideally takes into ac­
count bank activities in setting premiums and extending coverage, such that banks 
have an ex ante incentive to promote social w ell-being.1 ’2
Unfortunately, in the banking context, insurance may be ineffective due to the 
correlation o f  failures am ong firm s.133 Indeed, precisely because it is systemic risk 
that provokes concern about bank collapses, private insurers are unlikely to be able 
to provide meaningful protection. Insurance works by aggregating risks across the 
insured, so that the costs incurred by one party can be dispersed across the entire pool 
o f  insureds. But if  financial firms engage in sim ilar projects with the same risk pro­
files, then all firms will face insolvency risk at the same time. We have assum ed in 
our model perfect correlation among projects, so that all firms will be insolvent at 
the sam e tim e .134 In such a case, insurance will not have any impact on firm risk 
taking. W hile the perfect correlation assumption is clearly unrealistic, we still reach 
the qualitatively same result with regard to insurance, so long as a significant degree 
o f  correlation exists am ong the projects, and so long as the potential injuries are large.
129. For a discussion and economic analysis of such policies, see Steven Shavell, The 
Judgment Proof Problem, 6 Int’l. Rev. L. & Econ. 45, 54-55 (1986).
130. The regulator need not be the government, since a self-regulatory organization may 
do this by using a centralized third-party clearinghouse to achieve the same result.
131. The leading treatment of this issue is found in Steven Shavell, Minimum Asset 
Requirements and Compulsory Liability Insurance as Solutions to the Judgment-Proof Prob­
lem, 36 RandJ. Econ. 63 (2005).
132. FDIC insurance is only weakly linked to risk because of the danger o f self-fulfilling 
prophecy. Risk-based premiums are provided in 12 U.S.C. (j 1817(b)(1)(A), (C) (2012), and 
regulations arc set forth in 12 C.F.R. 327.9-327.10 (2016).
133. It is not clear that even the FDIC could adequately cover a single large bank failure. 
In the WaMu failure, for instance, the FDIC arguably rushed WaMu into receivership due to 
concern over the ability to fully insure its deposits in an abysmal failure. Jason Zasky, The 
Failure o f  WaMu, Failure (Aug. 2, 2012), http://failuremag.com/feature/article/the_failure
of wamu/ [https://perma.ee/KHH5-QJUZ] (interview describing FDIC concerns).
134. Perfect correlation means that firm risk increases linearly in the number of projects; 
independence would mean that firm risk increases in the square root of the number of projects.
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Under more realistic assum ptions in the model, when one financial firm experiences 
failure due to system ic risk, so will many others; insuring system ic events such as 
this is often beyond the scope o f  private insurers.
The intuition behind this result is borne out to some extent by recent experience 
with the failure o f  financial firms. W hile insurance for default risk in banking does 
exist in the form of, am ong other things, credit default swaps, system ic events may 
lead to industry-wide (and econom y-wide) failures and catastrophic loss amounts. 
This happened, for instance, with American International Group (A1G) credit default 
swaps written as protection on mortgage-backed securities; not only did certain bank 
assets fail, but much o f  A IG ’s asset portfolio declined in value as w ell.135 Insurance 
in this instance was woefully ineffective to properly incentivize firms, and the com ­
mon narrative is now that insurers them selves expected strategic judgm ent proofness 
to work in their favor.136
3. Ex Ante Regulation: Size and Asset Type Restrictions
Given the failures— both theoretical and, apparently, real— o f  both litigation and 
insurance in governing bank behavior, some additional m ethod o f  regulation is 
necessary. We turn our attention now to several variations on what we generically 
term ex ante bank regulation— activity restrictions o f  various sorts— which constrain 
either the am ount o f  banking activity that a firm may undertake or else the sorts o f  
projects available to the firm.
Analogizing to other industries, activity restrictions are sim ilar to com m and-and- 
control regulation, where experienced bureacrats prescribe m andatory best practices 
for the firm. Com m and-and-control is most com monly found in areas o f  relatively 
slow developm ent o f  products and technologies, and where inform ational asym m e­
tries between regulators and firms are low. For exam ple, in stable industries, like 
energy utilities, the costs and benefits o f  the activities are well known, and the 
am ount o f  innovation is relatively small (putting aside the concern that low innova­
tion results from the degree and form o f regulation). Energy producers rarely produce 
new products, and regulators can reasonably estim ate the future social costs and 
benefits o f  activities based on historical experience. Such judgm ents are made on the 
basis o f  rigorous cost-benefit analysis, as it is relatively straightforward to estimate 
with som e scientific precision the impacts o f  regulations on individuals and firms. 
The EPA can therefore be relatively confident that by limiting firm activities in 
particular ways it is not causing underproduction (or allowing overproduction) o f  
valuable products and services. The EPA might, for instance, mandate a cap on 
particulate em issions from a particular sort o f  factory, as well as prescribe production
135. See Richard Squire, Shareholder Opportunism in a World o f  Risky Debt, 123 Harv. 
L. Rev. 1151, 1152 (2010). While Squire writes that AIG would not necessarily have been 
insolvent based solely on the policies it wrote, its assets (largely placed in real estate) declined 
significantly in value at the time of the banking crisis, id. at 1194-98.
136. For instance, the International Association of Insurance Supervisors issued a position 
statement on the financial crisis noting that the insurance industry itself is susceptible to sys­
temic risk. Int’l Ass’n of Ins. Supervisors, Position Statement on Key Financial 
Stability Issues (2010), http://www.iaisweb.0rg/pagc/ncws/other-papcrs-and-reports//f1le 
/34040/iais-posilion-statement-on-key-financial-stability-issues [https://perma.cc/7D6P-UCQ5].
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methods, effectively limiting production to a set specification based on extensive 
knowledge o f the products created and the harms imposed by those emissions.
This ex ante regulatory approach is, however, o f questionable efficacy in fast- 
evolving areas such as technology or structured finance, where the costs and benefits 
of new products are likely much more difficult to determine in advance. Finance also 
contains many dispersed heterogeneous innovators, producers, and consumers, again 
unlike centralized energy production. It is perhaps for this reason that cost-benefit 
analysis— at least as rigorously practiced by regulators like the EPA— has 
historically not been a part o f the regulation o f securities and other financial 
products.1 ’7
This points to a general drawback of activity level and other forms of command 
and control regulation: the level of overall social welfare is constrained by what the 
regulator knows at the time of creating the regulatory structure. As such, ex ante 
regulation fails to take account of valuable information held by the firms, by the 
consumers, and by the regulator after observing production and usage for some time. 
This may mean that the activity level regulation inefficiently constrains production 
to a suboptimal level, as in the case where the regulator overestimates the costs or 
underestimates the benefits of the activity. Or, quite the opposite, this may mean that 
the activity level regulation is not strict enough.
An additional problem of being the first mover is regulation will necessarily have 
to be designed to anticipate behavior, and this means that behavior can be adjusted 
to avoid the regulation. Loopholes may be gameable by the firm; firms may simply 
switch from the proscribed means of production into more harmful or less efficient 
ones. When a firm’s first-choice project becomes more costly due to regulation, the 
firm may switch to a second-choice project, which may be done with increased risk 
in order to boost returns to be similar to the first-best project.
The use of credit derivatives is an example of this sort o f regulatory arbitrage. 
Capital adequacy rules require banks to hold capital in reserve, based on a risk 
calculation. In order to free up capital, banks engage in risk-transferring contracts 
known as credit derivatives. Banks make loans for mortgages, for instance, and then 
transfer some of the risk of the mortgage to other investors. This allows them to hold 
less cash in reserve. For example, a loan of $100 would be packaged with other loans 
in a special-purpose entity, and then interests in the portfolio of loans would be sold 
to investors. In this way, the bank could make new loans without holding cash in 
reserve for the original loans.1’8
137. The D.C. Circuit recently reversed and remanded a SIX' rule regarding shareholder 
access to the corporate proxy on grounds that the SEC did not engage in cost-benefit analysis 
of the rule. Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144, 1152 (D.C. Cir. 2011). Thereafter, the 
House passed a bill that would have mandated the SEC to do cost-benefit analysis for every 
rule. See Andrew Ackerman, House Lawmakers Pass SEC Cost-Benefit Bill, Wall St. J. (May 
17, 2013,4:27 PM) http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB 1000142412788732476700457848 
9410238066202 [https://perma.cc/WR8K-HGT9]. The bill went no further.
138. See Mishkin & Eakins, supra note 35, at 336—40, for a brief overview of mortgage- 
backed securities practices.
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a. Firm Size Limits
Despite these general drawbacks, several recent proposals for bank regulation 
involve some form of preset activity limitation. These include proposals to limit the 
size of banks, restrict leverage or balance sheet growth, impose taxes on financial 
transactions, and limit the financial products that may be made available, as a form 
of financial “FDA.” We consider these now in turn.
A common proposal to constrain bank behavior is to simply limit the size of 
banks. For instance, economist and former Secretary of Labor Robert Reich has 
written that “the only way to make sure no bank it [sic] too big to fail is to make sure 
no bank is too big.”139 Several academics and banking observers have also proposed 
concrete limits on bank size.140 These proposals are based on a common sense view 
that if banks are constrained from growing their balance sheets, the level of risk 
undertaken by any individual bank will be smaller.
From the analysis of the shareholder’s decision in the absence of regulation,141 we 
know that shareholders will have the bank engage in too much activity in general. In 
our model, shareholders will generally prefer more banking activity than regulators; 
therefore, any limit set by the regulator will likely bind. In such a case, the regulator 
chooses activity level limit a, which is the maximum number of projects that a firm 
can undertake, with the expectation that the limit will be binding; the size of the 
firm’s balance sheet will then be a.
An obvious problem is that the regulator does not observe the realization of either 
the number of profitable projects (n; and nh), or the level of profitability of those 
projects (nl and nh). So, for purposes of setting size limits, the regulator relies simply 
on the distribution of those variables, which we assume to be common knowledge. 
The greater the variance of these distributions, the less likely it is the regulator’s rule 
will be helpful, and the expected social welfare will be lower. The shareholder knows 
the realizations of these variables, but because of her conflicting incentives, simply 
telling the regulator these values is not credible. This basic problem—the limited 
knowledge of the regulator acting before activity is undertaken— is a general 
problem with ex ante bank regulation of all forms.
Consider also the bank’s and shareholder’s incentive given a size limit of a. 
Returning to our numerical example above, suppose that the regulator limits banks 
to a balance sheet size of $6. This happens to correspond to the number of profitable 
projects available to the bank (recall that n, = nh = 3, nL=nh = $0.20). But this does 
not mean that the bank will invest in only profitable projects; to the contrary, the 
bank will choose to undertake six high-risk projects, only three of which are 
profitable, leaving aside the three profitable low-risk projects. What the size 
restriction has done, in this case, is simply to drive the bank into exclusively high- 
risk projects. We think that this is likely to be a problem in the real world: banks who 
are constrained in the size of their balance sheets have incentives to get more bang
139. Robert Reich, Break Up the Banks: Why We Must Limit the Size o f  Bants, Christian 
Sci. Monitor (Apr. 6, 2010), http://www.csmonitor.com/Business/Robert-Reich/2010/0406 
/Break-up-the-banks-Why-we-must-limit-the-size-of-banks |https://perma.cc/264D-Z3ZG].
140. See Macey & Holdcroft, supra note 26. at 1372-73, and accompanying text.
141. See supra Part ll.B.l.
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for their buck, in the form of higher risk projects, even if those projects are not 
socially desirable.
There are yet other reasons to think that this approach is highly inefficient. Partly 
this is because limits on firm size are, by design, a one-size-fits-all solution. Our 
model assumes one representative bank. In reality, though, firms are, o f course, 
different, and some firms may have many more profitable projects than others; 
management may be better, for instance, or the opportunities open to that bank may 
simply be o f higher quality. In terms o f our model, if we add more banking firms and 
allow 7i;, nh, 7T(, and n h to vary across firms, the regulator’s one size fits all rule is 
necessarily imperfect— even in the case o f  perfect information. Putting this in the 
context o f the real world, it may well be that some banks are justified in being quite 
big, while other poorly run banks ought to remain quite small.
The nature o f systemic risk, and how it evolves over time across the banking 
sector, presents another problem with ex ante regulation. The regulator may receive 
subsequent information about both the profitability of the firm and the systemic harm 
that the firm is likely to impose. This is especially true for systemic risk, where the 
likelihood o f a systemic event depends upon what other banks and financial firms 
are doing and is something that the regulator is uniquely situated to observe. For 
instance, in a two-bank world, if Bank 1 is heavily invested in subprime real estate, 
but Bank 2 is not, Bank 1 likely carries far less systemic risk than in the 
counterfactual case where Bank 2 holds highly identical assets on its balance sheet.
This issue o f similar asset holdings across banks suggests an additional 
shortcoming o f size limits. If the sum o f expected systemic harm across banks— R in 
our model— is a function o f the sum of all projects undertaken, then the number of 
banks into which those projects are divided is meaningless. The rationale o f size 
limits assumes that projects abandoned by one bank, as it hits its asset limit, will not 
simply be picked up by additional banks— that is, there are a fixed number of banks, 
such that size limits really do limit overall banking activity. If new banks simply take 
on those projects, then the industry-aggregated bank balance sheet and portfolio 
correlation is unchanged. Suppose, for example, that in the absence of regulation, 
Bank 1 would undertake 100 projects, imposing an expected cost of $100,000 on 
society. If the regulator limits Bank 1 to only 50 projects, and no other banks arise 
or capitalize on the foregone projects, the regulator has successfully limited risk. If 
instead, however, Bank 2 is formed to snatch up the remaining 50 projects, there is 
no reason to think that the overall expected costs and benefits imposed on society 
will be any different than in the unregulated case with only Bank 1. They are, after 
all, the exact same projects, separated only by the corporate fiction. Unless there is 
something significant with regard to the particular corporate shell itself that houses 
the assets,142 then size limits will do little to prevent opportunistic risk taking. While 
a convincing account of systemic risk is required to definitively answer whether 
cabining projects in separate corporate shells alleviates systemic risk, no such 
account exists; until one is provided, we think size limits are unlikely to help.
142. It is conceivable that there are significant real differences to having the same number 
of assets in one bank as opposed to spread homogeneously across two banks. For instance, 
Reich suggests that larger banks have economics of scale in buying off politicians and regulators, 
suggesting that “too big to fail” is really a product of public choice. Reich, supra note 139.
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b. Prudential Regulation and Capital Adequacy Requirements
One of the primary ways in which banks are currently regulated is by setting a 
limit on the amount of banking activity that can be undertaken relative to the amount 
of shareholders’ equity. Such principles are embodied in the capital adequacy ratios 
under the Basel Accords discussed above.14’ Supposing, for instance, that the 
regulator mandated a capital adequacy ratio of 8% (as is required under Basel),144 a 
bank with shareholder equity of $100 million would be allowed to engage in only up 
to $1.25 billion of financial activity. If the bank or its shareholders wished to engage 
in more activity, they would have to raise more equity capital.
This type of prudential regulation is designed to protect the firm’s creditors. A 
required equity cushion based on the amount of debt helps assure creditors that they 
do not take on more risk than initially contemplated. It also gives equity investors 
some downside, which may reduce risk taking to an extent. The problem, however, 
is that prudential regulation of this sort does little to protect those outside of the firm 
and to prevent large amounts of risk-taking activity.
Return to our numerical example from Part II.B.l. Suppose our shareholder has 
put $0.87 in the bank. Under an 8% capital adequacy ratio requirement, the equity 
holder can maintain up to $10 in debt, which gives a maximum activity level of 
$ 10.87.145 The shareholder can, if she wishes, engage in more financial activity; all 
that is required is that she commit more of her own money. This is true whether or 
not the activity in question is socially benefica! or costly. The question that must be 
asked of prudential regulation is: will she commit such another dollar, even if 
additional investment is unproductive and only increases risk?
The answer, unfortunately, is yes, given that the increase in risk is large enough. 
If there is an additional high-risk project available (recall that these cost $ 1 and return 
$3 or -$! with even odds), the shareholder’s net increase in expected payoffs from 
adding this project is $0.50.146 This is so even though the project is not, in 
expectation, profitable, and even though it increases expected social costs by $0.16. 
In contrast, if all that were available were an additional unprofitable low-risk project, 
then the shareholder would be indifferent, since her net return from the investment 
is zero.
It is also worth noting which projects will be abandoned as capital adequacy ratios 
tighten. Suppose the regulator tightens the capital adequacy ratio from 8% to 30%. 
Given the shareholder’s endowment of $2, the maximum possible size of the bank is 
$6.67—so which projects will the shareholder choose to abandon? The hierarchy of 
projects abandoned would be low-risk unprofitable projects, low-risk profitable 
projects, high-risk unprofitable projects, and high-risk profitable projects, in that 
order. Hence, a tightening of capital requirements may lead to a greater equity 
investment and more high-risk investment—or it could lead to an abandonment of 
low-risk projects and a flight into high-risk ones. One thing it does lead to is less 
banking. Consider the extreme case: even in an all-equity bank (a capital adequacy
143. See supra Part I.B.2.
144. See Basel Capital Accord (Basel I), supra note 74.
145. $.87 divided by 8% equals approximately $ 10.87.
146. Recall that, in the event of success, the shareholder will keep the gains in excess of 
the debt outstanding, while in a failure the shareholder simply walks away with $0.
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ratio requirem ent o f  100%), the shareholder may still take excessive risks from a 
societal perspective. W hat changes is that the size o f  the bank will be smaller: the 
bank funded only by the shareholder’s $2 endowm ent will be able to make only $2 
o f  loans (in high-risk projects, o f  course). The overall risk level may be lower even 
though average project risk is higher; what this means is that the level o f  lending has 
contracted enorm ously, as has the money supply. Neither o f  these outcom es is good 
for the economy.
Risk weighting may alleviate some o f  these problem s. Currently, however, the 
gradation o f  risk weighting is sufficiently coarse that it does not account for such 
differences am ong assets. For example, a bank issuing a high-yield and high-risk 
com mercial loan would receive the same risk weighting as a low-yield, low-risk 
com mercial loan o f  the same term. N or does Basel III make distinctions among 
quality o f  home loans or am ong trading positions o f  sim ilar m aturities.147
This is not to say that capital adequacy rules are without value. W hat such 
requirem ents do is keep the shareholders from expropriating the firm ’s debt holders. 
Every dollar that the shareholder puts in, keeping the assets constant, is a  dollar that 
cushions the depositors and other creditors in the event o f  a  loss. Minimum capital 
rules may help mitigate losses otherw ise borne by creditors and the FDIC, but they 
will do little to prevent excessive bank activities that generate system ic risk or other 
social harms. Such a rule makes sense given FDIC insurance (which renders 
depositors indifferent to banking risk), but it is a costly form o f  risk limitation.
c. Financial Transaction Taxes
A tax is often preferable to a direct lim it on activity. Pigovian taxes, in which tax 
rates for goods and services are tied to their expected social cost, can be a useful 
mechanism for forcing actors to internalize the costs o f  their behavior.148 For 
example, automobile use leads to externalities in the form o f pollution and 
congestion. W hile one approach would be to limit the am ount o f  driving that people 
may do, the hours at which driving may occur, or the number and type o f  cars that 
can be sold, such a mandate would fail to take into account private information about 
costs and benefits and, even with perfect inform ation, would fail to satisfy 
heterogeneous tastes and needs.
A better approach may be to impose a tax upon autom obile usage or gasoline 
consumption, w ith the tax level set at the level o f  externality. If the tax is set at 
exactly the externality level, then even individual users will make socially optimal 
choices.149 W hile there may be som e conceivable heterogeneity in externalized costs
147. For a summary of the Basel III rules, see Davis Polk, U.S. Basel III Final Rule: 
Visual Memorandum, (2013), http://www.translegalstudies.org/symposium_20l4/materials 
/Panel_l/Panel%201%20CLE%20_U.S.Basel.III.Final.Rule.VisuaI.Memo%2006.09.2013% 
20Davis%20Polk%20WardwelI%20LLP.pdf [https://perma.ee/7N9A-DJZB].
148. For an overview of Pigovian taxes, see Victor Fleischer, Curb Your Enthusiasm for  
Pigovian Taxes, 68 Vand. L. Rev. 1673, 1682-90 (2015).
149. This approach, known as Pigovian taxation, has broad appeal among economists for 
precisely these reasons. Economist Greg Mankiw started the “Pigou Club” to collect the names 
of economists who support a broader use of Pigovian taxes. Greg Mankiw, Rogoff Joins the 
Pigou Club, Greg Mankiw’s Blog (Sept. 6, 2006), hllp://gregmankiw.blogspot.com/2006
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among end users, such differences are likely quite small relative to the common and 
uniform costs imposed (such as carbon dioxide emissions) by burning a gallon of 
gasoline. Such an approach is likely superior to the command-and-control approach 
or the no-reguation case.
So, then, by analogy, if financial transactions lead to systemic risk in the same 
way that gasoline consumption leads to pollution, a tax on financial transactions 
might make sense. In 2009, the Speaker of the House proposed such a tax,150 and 
France recently imposed one to apply not only in France but on all transactions 
involving French firms, including American Depositary Receipt (ADRs) of French 
companies traded in the United States.151 The idea, which originated with John 
Maynard Keynes, is to reduce risk taking by taxing marginal trades on the belief that 
these are more likely to be based on “speculation” instead of “investment.” 152
But, there are some clear problems with such an approach, as the foregoing 
analysis of activity level limits suggests. As with other forms of ex ante regulation, 
the regulator must have a great deal of information available to it about the projects 
profitably available to each bank in order to set a reasonable tax rate. Setting the tax 
level too high prevents socially beneficial transactions, while setting the tax too low 
allows too much risky banking activity. There may also be a problem, again, with 
bank heterogeneity: if different banks have different sorts of opportunities with 
differnet risk profiles, then a one-size-fits-alI approach will tend to punish banks 
whose activities carry little inherent risk and reward ones whose activities are of 
above-average riskiness. Proposed taxes attempt to differentiate among activities 
with, for example, different rates of tax for transactions in each of stocks, bonds, and 
derivatives.
This brings us to the fundamental problem of a transactions tax: the number of 
financial transactions or projects is a flawed proxy for systemic risk created by the 
entire bank portfolio. Such a tax may then be ineffective, or even have perverse 
effects, pushing banks into overall riskier transactions. The reason is that higher-risk 
projects, which carry higher payoffs for the shareholder, are more likely to remain 
profitable under a tax regime.
Consider again our simple model. The bank is financed with equity of e = $.80 
and FDIC-insured deposits of $0.20 such that the bank can engage in one project. 
The bank faces a choice between one high-risk and one low-risk project (recall that 
all projects are essentially coin flips, paying $3/—$ 1 and $2/$0 for high- and low-risk
/09/rogoff-joins-pigou-club.html [https://perma.cc/ZJ98-N4KX].
150. Thomas Ferraro & Andy Sullivan, Wall Street Tax “Has a Great Deal o f  Merit”: 
Pelosi, Reuters (Dec. 3,2009, 12:58 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/12/03/us-usa 
-congress-tax-idUSTRE5B24J520091203 | https://perma.ee/2C2P-MRYV].
151. See Steven Davidoff Solomon, In Wall St. Tax, a Simple Idea but Unintended Conse­
quences, N.Y. Times: Dealbook (Feb. 26, 2013, 5:20 PM), https://dealbook.nytimes.com 
/2013/02/26/in-wall-street-tax-a-simple-idea-with-uninlended-consequences [https://perma.ee 
/P2MA-W5QC],
152. The idea for such a financial tax goes back to at least 1936, when John Maynard 
Keynes proposed it as a curb on excessive speculation. Stephen Spratt, A Sterling 
Solution: Implementing a Stamp Duty on Sterling To Finance International 
Development 15-16 (2006), www.stampoutpoverty.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/A 
-Sterling-Solution.pdf [https://peima.ee/94F.Y-38BV].
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projects, respectively, plus profitability n). Suppose that the high-risk project is not 
profitable (n h = 0), and that the low-risk project is profitable (n ( = 1), with expected 
profitability of n L = $0.65. Finally, the expected systemic harm from the high-risk 
project is $0.16, while that from the low-risk project is $0.08.
Without the tax and under a laissez-faire system, the bank will invest in the 
profitable low-risk project and eschew the unprofitable high-risk one. Expected 
returns from underaking the low-risk project are 50% x ($0.65 -  $0.20) + 50% x 
($2.65 -  $0.20) -  $0.80 = $0.65. Expected returns from undertaking the high-risk 
project are 50% x $0 + 50% x ($3 -  $0.20) — $0.80 = $0.60, which is lower. In this 
case, the laissez-faire system achieves the social optimum, since the low-risk project 
has private returns to the shareholder of $0.65, no externalization to counterparties 
or depositors, and systemic externalized costs o f $0.08, for a net benefit o f $0.57. 
Undertaking the high-risk project, in contrast, would have private shareholder 
benefits o f $0.60, expected losses to counterparties of $0.50, expected losses to 
depositors (the FDIC) o f $0.10, and externalized systemic costs o f $0.16, for a net 
societal loss of $0.16.
Now, suppose the regulator attempts to be a good Pigovian by imposing a tax 
equal to the average systemic externality of projects, which in this case would be 
$0.12 per transaction. Perversely, this causes the bank to switch from the profitable 
low-risk project to the unprofitable high-risk project, making society worse off. 
Consider first the shareholder’s expected payoffs to the low-risk project, which are 
lowered by the full value o f the tax because of the bank’s continued solvency given 
either success or failure: 50% x ($.65 -  $0.12 -  $0.20) + 50% x ($2.65 -  $0.12 -  
$0.20) — $0.80 = $0.53. The high-risk project, on the other hand, allows the 
shareholder to escape the incidence of tax in the failed state o f the world: 50% x 0 + 
50% x ($3 -  $.12 -  $.20) -  $0.8 = $0.54. Payoffs to the high-risk project are now 
higher for the shareholder (by a penny), causing the bank to switch under the tax 
regime to the high-risk project. Social welfare is now $ 0 .5 4 -$ 0 .1 0 -$ 0 .5 6 -$ .1 6  + 
$0.12 - -$ 0 .1 6 .153 Not only did the tax actually increase systemic risk, but it caused 
the loss o f a profitable project. The total welfare loss under the tax regime is $0.70 
relative to the laissez-faire state.
A somewhat more general failing of a financial transactions tax is that the private 
payoffs are increasing in the degree o f externality created. Unless the tax can be 
calibrated to the actual risk created, imposing a tax only deters small risks with small 
payoffs; larger risks are relatively undeterred. For example, suppose 7r; = n h = $0 .10 
for all projects, while the systemic externalities o f the low- and high-risk projects are 
given, respectively, by dR/dl  = $0.08 and dR/ dh  = $0.16. This means that low-risk 
projects are socially desirable, while high-risk projects are not. Now apply a Pigovian 
tax o f $0.16 per transaction. Because the high-risk project provides ample upside to 
the shareholder, high-risk projects will be undeterred, even in an all-equity bank.154
153. The left-hand side of the equation is, in order: the shareholder’s expected private bene­
fit, the depositor’s (FDIC’s) expected loss, the expected externalities borne by counterparties, 
the expected systemic harm, and the amount of tax collected by the government.
154. The shareholder’s before-tax expected payoff in an all-equity bank undertaking the 
high-risk project would be 50% * ($0) + 50% * ($3.10) -  $1 = $0.55.
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Low-risk projects will, however, not be undertaken, since the upside is simply too 
low to make up for the tax.155
For a financial transactions tax to work well, the regulator would have to link the 
tax directly to the expected social costs in each case, including costs put onto 
creditors and counterparties. These may all vary project by project and bank by bank. 
This level of granularity puts huge informational demands on the tax setter and 
largely defeats the point of a Pigovian tax in the first place.
d. Command-and-Control—a Financial FDA
As discussed above, part of the reason activity level limits and financial 
transactions taxation will not work is due to the heterogeneity of projects, and the 
fact that private rewards may often be correlated with externalized harms. Taking 
that into account, some proposals call for treating different sorts of financial 
transactions differently, perhaps allowing some and prohibiting others based on their 
cost-benefit tradeoffs. This sort of command-and-control approach is analagous, for 
instance, to U.S. regulation of energy production, where some forms of production 
are mandated or prohibited, or to regulation of new medical drugs, where a testing 
and approval process is necessary before new drugs may be marketed. This analogy 
is, in fact, explicitly used in a proposal by professors Glen Wyel and Eric Posner for 
a “financial FDA.” They recommend financial products be approved before they can 
be sold, with the goal of eliminating or reducing needlessly speculatve (that is, risky) 
transactions that regulators believe will impose significant social costs.156
A potential stumbling block to this approach is that it is dubious that regulators 
can successfully identify, ex ante, which sorts of transactions impose unreasonable 
risks and little benefit. Finance is a fast-evolving world where new products and 
markets arise constantly; keeping regulators up to speed on new developments would 
require an army of quantitative PhDs in financial economics to thoroughly analyze 
every new financial instrument. Indeed, given that the systemic risk depends on what 
other firms throughout the economy do, preapproval even with the requisite 
manpower is a dubious proposition. As noted above, it is unlikely that any type of 
transaction is socially dangerous in the abstract, instead depending heavily on the 
quality of the bank engaging in the transaction, how many transactions the entire 
banking system is making (that is, the total activity level), and the correlation of risk 
across transactions. Unlike the regulation of drugs, where the risk to the individual 
consuming the drug is based solely on whether and how much of the drug the 
indiviudal takes, here, the risks for the bank and the banking sector cannot be 
estimated in a vacuum or for an individual bank, but rather must be determined based 
on the choices and practices of hundreds, if not thousands, of other actors.
Even assuming that riskier projects may be identified ex ante, a financial FDA 
cannot be a complete solution. The reason is that the same level of portfolio risk may 
be constructed in different ways; if very risky instruments are outlawed, a firm may
155. The shareholder’s before-tax expected payoff in an all-equity bank undertaking the 
low-risk project would be 50% x ($(). | ()) + 50% x ($2.10) — $ 1 =$0.10.
156. See Posner & Weyl, supra note 24 and accompanying text.
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be able to create the same overall portfolio characteristics with an agglomeration of 
lower-risk instruments.
Returning to our model, suppose that a bank has available to it both high- and 
low-risk investments, with a $1 equity investment by the shareholder. If the bank 
invests in a high-risk project, its possible returns will be either $3 or —$1, each with 
probability 50%; expected payoffs to the shareholder are $0.50. Suppose now that 
high-risk projects are prohibited under a financial FDA approach. Can the bank 
recreate the overall portfolio? Certainly—the bank can raise $1 in deposits and invest 
in two low-risk projects. This yields exactly the same risk-return profile as one high- 
risk project: in the good state, the bank has gross returns of $4, of which it must pay 
$1 back to its depositors; while in the bad state, the bank has $0 and owes its 
depositors $1. The shareholder’s expected return is the same, $0.50. Even though the 
financial FDA has prohibited the high-risk project, little has changed.1”
This is just a specific example of a more general point: modern financial 
instruments can create any risk-return combination in countless ways that defy easy 
categorization. A common illustration of this point is the concept of put-call parity.158 
Using a mix of traditional and derivative products, any given asset return can be 
artifically created by combining different types of financial products, including 
buying assets, buying derivatives, borrowing, lending, and so on. In other words, 
whatever the financial FDA outlaws can likely be recreated through some 
combination of alternative financial instruments. The nimbleness of investors at 
avoiding regulation arises in other areas of law as well, where traditional categories 
of securities ownership have become increasingly problematic.159
We think it likely that banning particular instruments would do much good. The 
financial industry has been particuarly adept at regulatory arbitrage. As a poignant 
example, the multi-trillion dollar market for credit derivatives arose in part because 
regulations prevented certain entities, like insurance companies, from making certain 
types of investments.160
157. Who bears the loss is different in the two cases. In the low-risk ease, the bank must 
raise deposits to purchase the two projects. With the high-risk project, no deposits need be 
raised, and the subsequent losses are borne by the trading counterparty. Given the 
conventional-wisdom assumption that neither depositors nor trading counterparties adequately 
protect their positions from credit risk, this difference may not be material.
158. See Fischer Black & Myron Scholes, The Tricing o f Options and Corporate Liabili­
ties, 81 J. Pol. Econ. 637, 649-54 (1973); Robert C. Merton, Theory o f  Rational Option Pric­
ing., 4 Bell J. Econ. & Mgmt. Sci. 141, 141-42 (1973); Alvin C. Warren, Jr., Financial Con­
tract Innovation and Income Tax Policy, 107 UARV. L. Rev. 460, 465-70 (1993).
159. Such issues arise elsewhere in the law, such as bankruptcy, tax, and corporate transac­
tions. See, e.g., Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Anti-Bankruptcy, 119 Yale L.J. 
648 (2010).
160. State law generally prohibited insurance companies from investing in debt with a 
rating of less than a certain credit rating, say AAA. This cut off insurance companies from 
most of the corporate debt market, until financial innovators developed mechanisms for 
generating what they thought was AAA-rated debt out of the debt of many companies with 
lower credit ratings. See, e.g., M. Todd Henderson, Credit Derivatives are Not “Insurance, ” 
16 Conn. Ins. L.J. 1 (2009); see also, e.g., N.Y. Ins. Law § 1402(a) (McKinney 2015); 3 
National Association of Insurance Commissioners, Model Law, Regulations, and 
Guidelines (2009) (describing risk-based capital levels).
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Put another way, the failing of a financial FDA is that it does not focus on overall 
portfolio risk. To do so, the financial FDA would need some complementary 
regulation, such as an activity level limit. For instance, if the regulator both 
proscribed high-risk projects and limited the bank to just one project in total, the 
regulator would successfully limit aggregate risk. At the very least, the regulator’s 
task will be more information-intensive than simply identifying a black list of 
prohibited instruments. Rather, the regulator must come up with a way to prohibit 
certain types of overall portfolios.
What this analysis suggests is that it is not enough to identify highly risky 
activities: lower-risk activities must be appropriately moderated as well, since they 
can be combined, either directly or synthetically, to create higher-risk activities. 
Thus, even if the regulator is able to observe, ex ante, high-risk financial products, 
in order to impose meaningful limitations on social risk, the regulator must also be 
able to observe the productivity of each sort of transaction and set activity levels 
accordingly, across all actors in the financial system. It would be pointless, for 
instance, to disallow synthetic collateralized debt obligations (known as CDOs) and 
the credit default swaps that back them,161 and yet allow accumulation of mortgages 
that may yield the same risky exposures. Given the innumerable permutations into 
which these sorts of financial instruments may be arranged, the financial FDA will 
have less information about these synthetic combinations and techniques ex ante than 
it will after observing them in practice. Overall, it may pay to wait.
4. A Middle Ground: The Regulatory Veto
The foregoing discussion of potential banking regulatory techniques reveals a 
general problem with all extant and proposed regulations: ex ante limits on the 
amount or sort of banking activity that may be undertaken are likely to be either 
ineffective at limiting risk or, if effective, costly because the regulator makes policy 
largely in the dark. Not regulating appears to be a poor option as well, since litigation 
and insurance will fail to constrain risk-taking activity due to problems of judgment 
proofness. The problem, then, is that it is not tenable to wait until harm actually oc­
curs, but neither is it workable to regulate ex ante what banks can and cannot do.
Fortunately, there is something of an intermediate solution in what we have 
termed the regulatory veto. Under the regulatory veto, the regulator does act to con­
strain banking activity, but operates after more information is gained by observing 
firm and customer choices, as well as getting better estimates of social losses. By 
refraining from ex ante regulation, the regulator avoids proscribing harmless or even 
beneficial activities; by retaining the right to observe the bank’s activities and to shut 
down the bank before actual harm has been incurred, the regulator can maintain 
meaningful deterrence and avoid problems of judgment proofness.
While this appears to be a great advantage of the regulatory veto, and we think 
explains its existence, any theory of the regulatory veto must consider why it is that
161. This is, to an extent, what Congress has done in the Dodd-Frank Act. See James 
Spindler, Making the Next Financial Crisis Worse, One Regulation at a Time, Forbes 
(Oct. 5, 2011, 1:34 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2011/10/05/making-the-next 
-fmancial-crisis-worse-one-regulation-at-a-time/#a8371217204a lhttps://perma.cc/SEL4-LNMY] 
(describing the problems with the SEC release on synthetic securities).
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banks were nevertheless encouraged to engage in excessive risk-taking activity. The 
regulatory veto existed before the Savings and Loan Crisis and before the financial 
crisis, and yet it was not effective at limiting excessive bank activities. Why did the 
regulatory veto, which we think is the best approach to banking regulation, fail?
As we develop in this section, the reason why is twofold. First, the structure of 
the regulatory veto encourages ultimatum-type behavior on the part of banks; for 
example, a bank may seek to become too big to shut down or otherwise plan such 
that any shutdown will be excessively costly. Second, the incentives of regulators are 
wrong: being constrained to maximize ex post social welfare means that the regulator 
will find it difficult to make credible threats to shut down even a bank that provides 
no (or even negative) social value.
To develop the intuition, we start with a not-unrealistic hypothetical. Bank I 
operates under a regulatory veto regime in which the regulator acts to maximize so­
cial welfare. Knowing that the regulator acts only after the bank assembles a portfolio 
o f loans and other investments, Bank 1 assembles an aggressive portfolio o f loan 
assets and liabilities. Bank I then presents this portfolio to the regulator for inspec­
tion. While the portfolio is much more aggressive than the regulator would prefer, 
the loans have already been made and the liabilities have already been incurred. The 
loans may even be profitable to the bank, which is powerful (albeit erroneous) evi­
dence of their social value.162 In effect. Bank 1 is daring the regulator to shut it down. 
The regulator’s choice, therefore, is a starkly limited one: the regulator will shut 
down the bank (or the particular banking activity) if, and only if, society is made 
better off by shutting down the bank (or the activity). So long as Bank I presents a 
portfolio o f investments with non-negative social value, it will be extremely difficult 
for regulators to shut it down.
A simple example shows why. If Bank l ’s loan portfolio has an expected profit 
to Bank l ’s stakeholders of $10 and an expected cost (borne by counterparties and 
society) o f $9, the regulator maximizes social welfare by refraining from shutdown. 
Social welfare in that case is $1, whereas it would be $0 in the event o f shutdown. 
The optimal amount o f bank activity might be strictly less than that which generates 
$10 for Bank 1, but obtaining this maximum may be difficult since the bank, as first 
mover and the bundler of investment projects, can control the portfolio of invest­
ments presented to the regulator.
In fact, Bank 1 could push things further, imposing costs on society of $9.99, such 
that social welfare is virtually a wash. Even in this case, the regulator will not veto 
the activity, since doing so would not increase social welfare. In fact, if the costs of 
shutdown are positive, then Bank 1 can present a portfolio of activities that have a 
social welfare o f zero (or even negative, up to the costs o f shutdown) and still have 
regulators forebear from shutting down the bank.
A simple picture o f this dynamic is shown in Figure 3. As in our model, expected 
bank profits are increasing in bank activity levels, although the marginal benefit is 
decreasing beyond a certain point. Importantly for setting the optimal regulatory
162. Bank examination manuals explicitly instruct examiners not to be distracted by bank 
profits, but examiners of failed banks and thrifts commonly cited bank profitability as an ex­
cuse for regulatory forbearance. See, e.g., Henderson & Tung, supra note 13, at 1024-25 
(citing the example of WaMu).
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policy, this point will be different for each bank. Expected social costs o f  bank 
activities are also increasing, but unlike firm profits, the marginal social cost is 
constantly increasing in activity levels.'63 Similarly, the social costs are likely 
different for each bank or each activity. In this case, the optimal am ount o f  bank 
activity (that is, the social welfare maxim um ) is where the sum o f  the two curves is 
at a m axim um — this is shown as point A on Figure 3. This is the regulatory sweet 
spot, and the point where all regulatory reform s are trying to reach. Ex ante 
regulations are trying to estimate it; ex post attem pts would be about discouraging 
banks from m issing it. But, in light o f  the ultimatum gam e dynam ic, a bank can 
increase its profitability (but not social welfare) by m oving up the profit curve to 
point B, where its profits are at a maximum. It will do so, o f  course, only if  it believes 
that the regulators will not shut down the activity. The regulator is in effect 
indifferent between points B and C on the curve, since in both cases the social welfare 
is zero. If shut down is costly (as it certainly is, along many dim ensions), then 
regulators will not act to move to point C, despite the fact that social welfare could 
be increased (at the expense o f  bank profits) by moving down the profit curve to 
point A.
Met social Social Net social
welfare -  0 optimum welfare = 0
Activity level (a)
Figure 3. Model o f bank profits and social costs.
163. If this were not the case, the social optimum would be one bank of incredibly large size.
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This kind of behavioral dynamic was evident in the failure of WaMu, which 
serviced nearly $125 billion in home loans and had over $200 billion in deposits prior 
to its collapse in 2008.164 Five years before it collapsed, examiners reported “signifi­
cant deficiencies in WaMu’s underwriting process for residential loans, its core loan 
activity.” 165 But regulators brought no enforcement actions against WaMu, despite 
the fact that the problems persisted and even worsened. Examiners knew about 
WaMu’s activities, they documented the excessive risk and lax controls, and were 
troubled by the amount of risk it was taking.166 But they did nothing. When examiners 
were asked by an inspector general why they did not take action to shut down 
WaMu’s excessively risky activities, examiners responded, “even though under­
writing and risk management practices were less than satisfactory, WaMu was mak­
ing money and loans were performing.” 157 WaMu, in effect, presented its regulators 
with an ultimatum: to condone their aggressive activity level, which was making 
large profits but at diminishing or negative amounts of social value, or shut down the 
bank. WaMu chose point B instead of point A and effectively dared the regulators to 
shut them down.
The key weapon WaMu apparently deployed was the fact that its loans were 
profitable. Bank profits may be a particularly powerful weapon in an argument about 
shut down, since they may—to the uninformed—suggest social value. Regulators’ 
higher ups specifically informed bank examiners that “it is not sufficient to demon­
strate that the loans are profitable or that the |bank] has not experienced significant 
losses in the near term.”168 This is because in theory bank regulators are aware that 
social welfare and bank profits are not the same, as seen clearly on Figure 3. But it 
may be much more difficult politically to shut down a profitable bank than an un­
profitable one. This may be true as a matter of political rhetoric, as the history of 
banking regulation shows frequent and disastrous involvement by politicians in the 
regulation of specific banks.169
But it may also be true as a matter of existing law. Banking law statutes generally 
limit regulators’ ability to shut down an entire bank to cases where the bank is “in­
solvent.” 170 Although it is widely accepted that bank regulators have “wide latitude 
to define insolvency,” 17' this restriction may be unnecessarily hamstringing regula­
tors into believing they have few options in the face of bank profits. This simply 
makes the dynamics of the ultimatum game worse than they would be if the regula­
tors have more flexibility to shut down entire banks. We will return to this issue 
below in Part III where we discuss potential reforms.
We return now to our simple model of bank behavior to illustrate explicitly these 
benefits and drawbacks of the regulatory veto. As before, the bank chooses how 
many projects it undertakes, starting with the profitable ones and moving on to those
164. Henderson & Tung, supra note 13, at 1025; see also WaMij Report, supra note 11, at 15.
165. Henderson & Tung, supra note 13, at 1025.
166. See W a M u Report, supra note 11, at 15-34.
167. Id. at 20.
168. Id. (citing guidance from WaMu’s bank regulator, the Office of Thrift Supervision).
169. For a discussion of how political influence impacted regulatory action during the S&L 
Crisis, see Epstein & Henderson, supra note 50, at 515-17, 536-39.
170. See FD1C Report, supra note 13, at 457.
171. Id
1608 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 92:1559
that do nothing but increase risk. Instead of imposing ex ante limits on the bank, the 
regulator waits for the bank to act; while waiting, the regulator observes a signal of 
the firm's expected production and the expected systemic cost R(a), where, for 
concreteness, a = 21 + h. After observing these signals, the regulator can either allow 
the firm to continue, getting the expected benefits of production and incurring 
expected systemic costs, or the regulator can shut down the firm, forcing a liquidation 
that yields d + e -  C, where C is the cost of liquidation and, as before, d + e is the 
capital investment of debt and equity holders. In other words, a shutdown and 
liquidation is able to recover the initial capital investment, but at some significant cost.
a. Perfect Information Case
For simplicity, we start with the case where there are no agency costs, 
shareholders have perfect information, and the regulator’s subsequent signal is 
perfectly revealing. Reasoning by backward induction, shareholders will choose the 
maximum level of activity that does not lead the regulator to shut down the firm or 
the activity. Shareholders know that the social welfare-maximizing regulator will 
shut down the firm or the activity if and only if the sum of the expected payoffs to 
equity, debt, and society, plus the cost of shutdown, exceeds zero. With this in mind, 
shareholders choose the level of activity that leads to the regulator being indifferent 
to the bank’s continuing. Formally, shareholders choose h and / such that 
Yii-l,hnini ~ R(.a) = ~C.
The good part of this approach is that all profitable projects are undertaken and 
the firm limits its overall risk to an ex post acceptable level. The drawback of this 
approach is that, because of the ultimatum-game dynamic with the regulator, the 
overall benefit created by banking is actually negative: it is -C , to be specific. Society 
would be better off without it. This is so even when we assume that the regulator 
receives perfect information with regard to risk, profitability, and social cost. The 
problem becomes worse if we imagine that shareholders have the ability to affect the 
cost of liquidation, C. As C grows larger, so too does the level of risk that 
shareholders will choose, and social welfare decreases in a one-to-one 
correspondence.
There are many ways to increase C, and we should expect banks, all else being 
equal, to utilize them to increase the chances that it can maximize its own profits. 
For instance, banks will tend toward complex transactions that are difficult to 
understand and unwind. In addition, banks will increase interconnectivity with other 
banks, which makes shutdown of particular activities more difficult and costly. They 
will also use separate legal entities, such as subsidiaries and special-purpose vehicles, 
especially ones outside of the jurisdictional reach—either physically or statutorily 
—of particular regulators, so that corporate fictions will make shutdown messier. 
Capturing regulators—either explicitly or implicitly through persuasion— is another 
mechanism for increasing the costs of shutdown. It is more difficult to hurt 
individuals that one knows, likes, and works with on a regular basis. Deploying 
politicians to give regulators a hard time, such as with hearings on Capitol Hill, is 
another tried and true mechanism. Finally, we should expect banks to certainly take 
no ex ante steps to ease subsequent liquidation, as is supposed to be the case with so-
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called living wills,172 since this simply lowers the costs of shut down, and therefore 
decreases expected bank profits in expectation.
b. Imperfect Information Case
In the case where the bank and regulators have imperfect information, the social 
welfare may actually be higher than when information is perfect. This is so because 
the bank is less sure of the regulator's signal and would not wish to risk complete 
shutdown and loss of all profits. In this case, the bank may err on the side of less 
profit, and, as it moves down the profit curve toward point A in Figure 3, increasing 
social welfare. More formally, suppose that the regulator observes the amount 
Y,i=i,hnini ~ or|ly will1 precision of plus or minus $1, relative to the firm’s 
signal. There will then be cases in which it behooves the firm to set a portfolio of 
activities such that Y,i=i,hnini ~ R(a) = $1. which represents an increase in social 
welfare of $1 over the perfect information case. This is not to say, however, that less 
information is necessarily good; one could imagine the extreme case where the 
regulator’s signal is so uninformative that it then behooves the bank’s shareholders 
to maximize both activity level and risk (although, ex ante, they may be less willing 
to invest in banking firms).
* * *
At this point, we have largely set out to do the work we intended to do. We have 
shown, with some simple intuition and a more formal model, that the extant and 
proposed mechanisms for optimizing bank risk taking are insufficient to accomplish 
this task. We have shown why regulators can do better by avoiding ex ante regula­
tion, and waiting until they have both a signal as to the value of bank activities to the 
bank and its customers, and a signal about the social costs of bank activities. But we 
have also pointed out a fundamental flaw in the regulatory veto approach. Although 
we leave it to others and other work to propose better fixes to the banking regulatory 
system, in the next Part we briefly offer some thought starters on potential ways to 
improve banking regulation.
III. HowTo M a k e  B a n k in g  R e g u l a t io n  B etter
As should be clear at this point, we are not optimistic that any form of ex ante or 
ex post regulation alone is going to help achieve the optimal amount of bank activity 
levels. The current reforms miss out on an important insight: the benefits of 
information acquisition and processing are increasing in time, which suggests there 
is benefit of delaying regulation, while the costs arising from judgment proofness are 
also increasing in time—which suggests there is benefit in accelerating regulation. 
Regulatory action is optimal where the tradeoff between these is at its maximum, 
suggesting the best approach is to improve the operation of the regulatory veto rather 
than to focus on either ex ante or ex post controls. Improving the dynamic between
172. Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Nelson D. Schwartz, “Living Wills "for Too-Big-To-Fail 
Banks Are Released, N.Y. T imes (July 3, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/04 
/business/living-wills-of-how-tD-unwind-big-banks-arc-tvleased.html | https://pemia.cc/R K117-RINK |.
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bank and regulator— as it involves the on-site examination and regulators ability to 
fine tune bank activities— is where regulatory reform can have the best effect.
Fred T ung and one o f the authors o f this Article have offered two ideas for giving 
regulators better incentives to get tough with banks, to disregard bank profits in the 
face o f socially inefficient risk, and to try to march banks down their profit curve 
toward point A in Figure 3. First, they proposed paying examiners for 
“performance,” defined as optimizing bank regulation toward point A .173 Although 
this proposal suffers from the problems around designing an optimal compensation 
package for bank executives discussed above, the idea o f trying to develop a 
compensation scheme that encourages regulators to act where they currently forebear 
is consistent with what we have said here. One can simply think o f incentive pay for 
examiners as a mechanism for overcoming the costs o f shutdown (noted as C in the 
discussion above).
Second, they proposed an auction mechanism for allocating examiners to 
particular banks as a way of ensuring better fit, o f encouraging greater production of 
information about bank quality and risk, and of combating regulatory capture.174 
Again, this proposal is consistent with our argument, in that it is about reducing the 
costs o f regulatory action, encouraging better accountability on the part o f regulators, 
and improving examiner quality and work.
There are other possibilities, which we will only mention here. In general, our model 
suggests the best reforms are the ones that focus on reducing the costs o f regulatory 
action (that is, reducing C), as the Henderson and Tung proposals try to do.
One o f these m ight be the requirement in the Dodd-Frank Act that the largest 100 
financial institutions (that is, those with greater than $250 billion in assets) submit 
“ living wills” to bank regulators to assist the regulators in winding down the banks 
in the event o f a failure.175 In theory, such living wills could help lower the regulatory 
shut down cost for an activity or an entire bank. This could lead to more regulatory 
action in the form o f the regulatory veto, and this might move us closer to the 
regulatory sweet spot. In addition, as noted above,176 banks do not have incentives to 
make the costs o f their shutdown lower, and therefore a regulatory requirement to do 
so may make sense.
There are problems with the rule as it now stands. First, much o f the information 
contained in the first batch of living wills was repetitive o f information about banks 
already publicly available.177 Bank regulators already know this information— plus 
much more— so packaging only publicly available information in a new form is 
unlikely to add much value. Second, as currently formulated, such living wills are
173. Henderson & Tung, supra note 13, at 1027-31.
174. See Henderson & Tung, supra note 106.
175. Section 165(d) of the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 requires certain large financial institu­
tions to prepare and update plans for orderly resolution of their balance sheets in the event of 
a threatened or actual collapse of the firm. 1'he rules arc promulgated as Regulation QQ for 
the Federal Reserve Board, 12 C.F.R. § 243 (2016), and Part 381 for the FD1C, 12 C.F.R. 
ij 381 (2016). For a list of and access to resolution plans required under the law, see Resolution 
Plans, Fed. Res. Board, http://www.federalreservc.gov/bankinforeg/resolution-plans.htm 
[https://perma.cc/YE29-UNGMI (last updated Dec. 13, 2016).
176. See supra Part 1.
177. Silver-Greenberg & Schwartz, supra note 172.
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designed to be deployed only in extreme circumstances, such as the rapid and 
unexpected failure of an entire bank.178 This is much less useful in terms of our model 
than a more general playbook on how to shut down specific bank activities, both as 
a stand-alone matter and in combination. For obvious reasons, banks will not 
voluntarily provide this information, especially if it is made public. Our analysis 
suggests that it would be valuable for regulators to have much greater transparency 
and a road map to reduce the costs of shutting down bank activities (in our model, 
lowering C). This is not the current approach.
Another possibility is the use of a device through which regulators precommit to 
take a regulatory action in the event of certain eventualities. In other words, 
regulators would remove some of the discretion from the examination process, so as 
to signal to banks that the costs of regulatory action are low, and therefore try to alter 
the incentives in the regulatory ultimatium game that is currently played. If banks 
believe regulators will exercise the regulatory veto in certain circumstances, then 
when they move first they will be reluctant to generate those circumstances. Of 
course, predicting the optimal circumstances in which to exercise the veto is a 
difficult challenge, since this falls into the ex ante bucket of regulation, and therefore 
is subject to the criticisms we have outlined above. But the virtue of combining an 
ex ante precommitment device with the regulatory veto is that it allows the regulators 
to observe costs and benefits, and only shut down those activities that, in practice, 
result in suboptimal levels of bank activity or care.
An analogy to this regulatory approach are the so-called “prompt corrective 
action” rules (PCA).170 These rules remove regulator discretion to act when certain 
triggers are met. They were put in place in the wake of the S&L Crisis after the 
evidence that politicians influenced regulators to forebear from taking action that 
would have reduced losses.180 For instance, if bank leverage ratios fall below pre­
scribed levels, regulators have no choice but to a c t, among other things, to force the 
bank to raise additional capital. This approach could be expanded to include not only 
compliance with leverage limits, but also to encourage optimal bank activity levels. 
Regulatory higher ups could estimate the optimal number of regulatory curtailments 
based on historical practice, prevailing bank practices, and macroeconomic 
conditions. A target could be set, with an algorithm for determining whether 
regulatory action is warranted in a particular case. The key insight of the PCA model 
is that regulators may be unable to act when it is optimal for them to act. In the PCA 
case, the disease was meddling by politicians who were beholden to bankers. In this 
case, it is regulators subjected to an ultimatum game in which bankers can force 
regulators into a rational but suboptimal regulatory choice.
Conclusion
Banking regulation has repeatedly failed, most recently in the run up to the 
financial crisis. The solutions offered for the latest failures largely fall into traditional 
categories: ex post remedies (following from tort law) and ex ante prophylaxes
178. Id.
179. 12 U.S.C. ij 1831 o (2012).
180. See Epstein & Henderson, supra note 50. at 516-17.
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(following from command-and-control regulations, like in environmental law). Pro­
posals to change banker incentives through mandatory forms of compensation, to 
limit the size of banks, and to require additional capital all fall into these categories. 
While individual reforms might be somewhat helpful, especially in combination, our 
analysis shows the fundamental weakness of relying solely on ex ante or ex post 
forms of regulation.
Ex ante regulations put burdens on regulators that are too high in terms of 
information and knowledge relative to the case where the same regulatory decisions 
would be made later in time. Regulators deciding on the optimal amount of bank 
activity or bank care simply do not have all the information they will need to make 
the best regulatory decision they can make. It might be better to wait. If regulators 
can learn about the private and social benefits and costs of particular bank activities 
by watching them in practice, then there are gains from regulatory delay. As we 
show, this is especially true in modern finance, where there are heterogeneous firms, 
products, and consumers. In this case, an ex ante, one-size-fits-all approach will over- 
and underdeter conduct. In short, ex ante regulation might be sensible where 
expected harms are large, innovation is uncommon, and regulatory arbitrage is 
costly, but banking is (increasingly) an area in which, while expected harms may be 
large, there is a tremendous amount of innovation, and the ability to arbitrate 
regulations is extremely easy.
Delaying too much, however, may result in a lost opportunity for any effective 
regulation. While ex post litigation (or insurance) might be effective in producing 
optimal incentives for most consumer products and services, the nature of systemic 
risk means that for banks there are significant judgment-proofness problems, espe­
cially if defaults are highly correlated across the financial sector. If excessive bank 
activity is only revealed when banks fail, then tort liability does little good, especially 
with the presence of limited liability and implicit and explicit government guaran­
tees. In such cases, the tort literature suggests insurance (or bonding) is efficient, but 
if the default risk of insurance companies is correlated with bank systemic risk, as 
appears to be somewhat true from recent experience, then ex post insurance will be 
insufficient to optimize bank risk taking.
It is for these reasons that we think bank regulation has historically involved 
another, more unique form of regulation, which we call the regulatory veto. Regula­
tors who work at specific banks full-time observe the banks’ activities and are 
empowered to require a change in the activity level or care a particular bank takes. 
The logic is to try to optimize the tradeoff between information production and analy­
sis by the regulators—which is increasing over time—and the efficacy of any regula­
tory action—which is decreasing over time. The regulatory veto is designed to find 
this point, which is likely to vary by bank, by financial product, and depends heavily 
on the prevailing economic circumstances.
Unfortunately, we show how the current design of the regulatory veto is unlikely 
to result in its effective use. Because banks act first, they can present a socially ineffi­
cient portfolio of bank activities to regulators who cannot improve social welfare by 
shutting down the activities. In other words, the current regulatory veto is inherently 
flawed by an ultimatum-game dynamic in which regulators rationally act in ways 
that destroy social welfare. It follows that banks will engage in practices, like opacity, 
complexity, and regulatory capture, that are designed to influence this process.
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We do not offer a complete solution for this problem, leaving that to others or 
other work. But our analysis does suggest that the reforms most likely to be effective 
at optimizing bank activity levels are ones designed to increase the ability of regula­
tors to precommit to take regulatory action in the face of evidence of excessive bank 
risk taking.
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